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Above: Vaino Mathies Seth Hannell, American
1896-1964. Steel Making, 1936, oil on canvas, 42 1/2 x
48 inches. Sloan Collection, Valparaiso University
Museum of Art. Gift of Hazel Hannell. 87.25.
Painted after a visit to a steel plant, this painting recalls the social realist murals of the '30s, and records the primary work life on the "steel coast" of
southern Lake Michigan.
Cover: Audrey Ushenko, American b. 1945. Age of
Iron, 1985, oil on canvas, 36 x 48 inches. Sloan Collection, Valparaiso University Museum of Art. Sloan
Fund Purchase. 87.23. By a former VU art teacher,
this painting is an expressionist interpretation of
the classical Shepherds-in-Arcadia theme showing
humans pondering the meaning of death.
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IN LUCE TUA
Comment on Contemporary Affairs by the Editor

Thinking about Community
Presidential election campaigns provide among
other things an opportunity for Americans to consider
what kind of community they are and what kind they
would like to be.
The conventional wisdom suggests that Americans
are not very good at community, that their traditional
emphasis on individualism and individual rights renders them incapable of any sustained concern for the
common good. There is some truth in this view : anation founded on the Lockean assumption that government exists only to preserve individual rights to life,
liberty, and property is not one to which the language
of community comes naturally or easily. Foreign observers of our politics almost invariably focus on individualism as the distinguishing mark of American
political culture and they characteristically note it as
the abiding weakness and debilitating blind spot of
what passes for a common life among us.
Our individualism takes its most common political
form in a pervasive mistrust of government. President
Reagan gave that view classic expression in his inaugural address in a phrase that has become the dominant theme of his administration: "Government is not
the solution to our problem; it is the problem." Only
in America is one likely to hear the chief of state trash
the enterprise of which he is the head. It has been the
subliminal message of the Reagan administration that
the federal government would achieve its highest fulfillment in finding a way to go out of business. Behind
this distrust of government lies an essentially libertarian instinct, one which celebrates the heroic lone individual in his perpetual struggle against the oppressive
powers of the collectivity as mobilized and expressed
in the state. Thus in an ironic inversion America's central common value-individualism-becomes the occasion by which community, at least as manifested in
political form, regularly gets denied .
The worship of individualism and the concomitant
skepticism concerning bonds of political community
are less in evidence among contemporary liberals. Ever
since the New Deal, American liberals have embraced
encompassing visions of national communal ties.
Franklin Roosevelt argued that citizens should extend
"to our national life the old principle of the local community" and think of themselves as neighbors on a national scale. In the last 25 years, liberals have increasingly turned to the metaphor of family to give expression to their communal visions. Lyndon Johnson pic-
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tured America "as a family, its people bound together
by common ties of confidence and affection" while
Walter Mondale, picking up on a theme artfully developed by Mario Cuomo, urged Americans in 1984 to
think of themselves as "a community, a family where
we care for each other, knit together by a band of
love." (These quotations are borrowed from Michael J.
Sandel's thoughtful essay, "Democrats and Community," in the February 22 New Republic.) Liberal Democrats typically affirm strong government-especially at
the federal level-as a molder of community, and they
are far less likely than their conservative Republican
opponents to compose hymns of praise to American
individualism. Liberals invert the Reagan formulation:
government is the solution to social problems, and in
acting to solve them it shapes and enlivens the ties of
community.
Yet even American liberalism has problems speaking
of community in persuasive terms. As Sandel notes,
our version of European social democracy, the welfare
state, finds roots rather different than is the case elsewhere. The American Left bases its appeal not so
much on grounds of communal ties and obligations as
in ideas of individual rights and entitlements writ large
and insistent. Collectivist liberals in America have
learned to turn the language of traditional individualist liberalism to their own advantage, but they
have not thereby managed to change the rules of the
rhetorical game. Indeed, one often hears charges that
American liberalism today constitutes not so much a
cohesive communal vision as an endless accumulation
of special individual and group interests. Thus
liberalism seems less a lesson in solidarity than a
cautionary tale in individualism run riot.
But the problems of the American Left run deeper
than that. American liberals encounter difficulty in
credibility more when they are taken at their collectivist word than when they come under suspicion of a
camouflaged individualism. The metaphor of the nation as family invites suspicion not because one doubts
it is genuinely intended but because it is inherently implausible. What can it possibly mean to imagine a
quarter-billion human beings in terms of family? All
of us know on a moment's reflection that the
metaphor of society as family cannot withstand close
analysis. It destroys all sense of proportion, all measure of publidprivate distinction. Moral seriousness requires moral modesty, and American liberalism has
failed to capture the national social imagination on this
point because it is morally grandiose.
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Community to be genuine, to constitute more than
rhetorical gesture, requires expression within human
scale. The nation is a community only in the most
generalized sense. There are too many of us to form
bonds of national intimacy, and our common beliefs
and values, cohesive enough to generate a broad politIcal consensus, do not make of us an ideological or
moral family. The bonds of American patriotism, the
strength of which no one doubts, do not require that
we pretend to ties deeper than actually exist.
It is true that individualism is not enough. Fulfillment of ourselves as moral beings requires that we
transcend the personal and even the familial. But
Americans have never been mere individualists. The
most acute observers of American life from Tocqueville onward have understood that the national genius
is not radical individualism but voluntarist cooperation. From the earliest days of the nation we have
sought out unforced forms of community as eagerly as
we have resisted statist coercion . Americans are better
at achieving genuine community-as the incredible vitality of our private religious, cultural, and social
realms indicates-than the public political language of
either Right or Left begins to suggest. Those who view
the American people as nothing more than an agglomeration of possessive individualists are simply not paying attention to the social evidence that exists all
around them.
As Michael Novak has suggested, the American ideal
of social life has to negotiate the narrow path between
extreme individualism and constricting collectivism
and hold up as its model the vision of the "communitarian individual," the independent and self-reliant citizen who nonetheless takes his place as a
member of the many communities that together constitute his social existence.
Serious talk of community requires attending not
only to Tocqueville but also to Edmund Burke, who
understood that it is our "little platoons"--our natural
communities of family, neighborhood, religion , and
voluntary association-that both form the essential
training grounds of more generalized political attachments and constitute our most intimate and enduring
bonds of social affection. (It is noteworthy that President Reagan, for all his customary bashing of government and exaltation of the individual, displays an instinctive-and politically compelling-appreciation of
Americans' deep communal attachments at the local
and personal level.) Those who cannot genuinely love
what is near and dear will never be trustworthy members of the larger political community. More than that,
our prior attachments to our little platoons will inoculate us against the idolatrous forms of nationalism towards which political community at its most intense is
4

regularly tempted.
Translated into political terms, this means taking
federalism seriously, and acting on the traditional wisdom of the principle of subsidiarity, under which decisions are wherever feasible made at the level most directly accessible to those whom the decision will affect.
It means as well that authentic notions of community
should ever seek the revitalizing of the "mediating institutions" of church, trade union , ethnic community,
neighborhood organization, etc. that intervene between the isolated individual and the larger political
society. (Peter Berger and Richard Neuhaus have written wisely and in detail on this point.)

Those who view the American people as
nothing more than an agglomeration of
possessive individualists are simply
not paying attention to the social
evidence that exists all around them.
It is perhaps most important of all in thinking about
community that we think of it in the plural. That not
only conforms to the reality of our social lives-we all
are part of many communities, with which we are associated according to varying principles and intensities
of attachment-but it helps keep political community
in the proper perspective. The political community is
neither our enemy, as the language of libertarian conservatism too often suggests, nor is it the "beloved republic" that the sense of community at its most intense
compels us to seek. The most monstrous deformations
of political community of our time (on both Left and
Right) have been rooted in unrestrained dreams of
Total Community that eventuated in one form or
another of totalitarian nightmare. The great AngloAmerican principle of limited government has to do
with matters not just of jurisdiction but of ambition.
We come together as a political community to order
our common life in justice. That is a noble undertaking. But it does not make of us a family, a comprehensive philanthropic enterprise, or a communion of the
like-minded. We honor the idea of community most
when we recognize its limitations as well as its inherently pluralistic nature. It is important that we remember always that we are by nature social animals;
it is important as well that we recognize and cherish
that element of irreducible individuality in our natures
that renders each of us, in Michael Novak's haunting
words, "curiously alone in the midst of solidarity." Out
of that necessary tension is our search for political life
together endlessly crafted.
Cl
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Mark Schwehn

FLUNKING MY SHOWER
Advice to Young Historians and Other Young Humanists

Several years ago I learned that at the University of
Chicago one cannot escape the life of the mind even
in the shower. It was early on a Monday morning. I
had just finished jogging in the old Bartlett gymnasium, and I was showering alone in the small
shower room next to the faculty lockers. I was soon
joined, however, by a small, elderly gentleman who
proceeded to introduce himself. He was, as it happened, one of the senior Americanists in the History
Department. I was also an Americanist, newly appointed to a position in the Humanities Division of the
College, not to the History Department. Thus, we had
not until that moment met one another.
He rushed through the conventional opening gambit that is played out whenever a senior faculty
member meets a new junior one. When had I been appointed? Which graduate school had I attended? Advisor? Thesis topic? Subject of current research? I
have never much cared for these little interrogations,
but this one seemed, given the time and the place,
particularly unnerving. It was a case of double exposure.
Oblivious to my discomfort, he pressed on. Had I
studied at all with David Potter? I told him I had.
What did I think of Potter's work? I told him I
thought it was brilliant,- perhaps the best work done
since World War II in the field of American history.
"But do you know who was really the best American
historian during the last thirty years?" he asked. I was
not sure that I knew. But I knew that he thought he
knew and that he thought I should know. Then I
began to worry.
Finally, I began to guess. Richard Hofstadter? No.
Bernard Bailyn? No. Eugene D. Genovese? No. (Was
my interlocutor expecting me to mention his name? I
resolved that I would not name him even if I came to
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believe, in my increasingly desperate state, that he really was the greatest.) Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.? No. At
last, I insisted that I had been right at the outset: I renominated David Potter. No. For the first and only
time in my life, I had the strange sensation that I was
somehow managing to accomplish something mconceivable. I seemed to be flunking my shower.

For the first and only time in my
life, I had the strange sensation
that I was somehow managing to
accomplish something inconceivable.
I seemed to be flunking my shower.
I was reminded of this episode while I was reading
Gertrude Himmelfarb's recent collection of essays, The
New History and the Old (Harvard University Press,
1987). The old history, according to Himmelfarb, was
primarily about politics and ideas, and its characteristic
mode of explanation was narrative. The new history is
primarily about popular values, beliefs, and attitudes
(mentalites, to use the fashionable word), and its characteristic mode of historical explanation is analytical.
The old history was synthetic and morally serious, an
autonomous type of human understanding. The new
history is theory-laden and methodologically promiscuous, a kind of retrospective cultural anthropology.
Having set up her contrary terms in this manner,
Himmelfarb of course laments what she takes to be
the "triumph" of the new history over the old.
I found myself in agreement with Himmelfarb up to
a point, but I kept thinking of my unpleasant shower
and of my former teacher David Potter. It occurred to
me that perhaps Potter was such a great historian because his work cut across the categories that Himmelfarb places in opposition to one another. He was a
master both of the grand narrative synthesis and of
the rigorous, analytical article. And his major work,
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The Impending Crisis, takes politics as its subject matter,
and it offers an account of the coming of the American Civil War that combines great narrative drive with
enormous theoretical sophistication.
But there was something more at work in my reading of Himmelfarb and my memory of Potter.
Through precept and example, Potter stood for a way
of doing scholarship that obviated the distinctions that
Himmelfarb was urging upon me. From time to time,
he gave advice about the study and the writing of history, but he seldom if ever pontificated. Rather, he offered occasional, gentle asides that seemed mysterious
at the time but have become more transparent and
compelling with age. At least three of these rather delphic pronouncements are worth transmission. The advice suggested by them is Potter's. The interpretations
are my own.
II

"Historians aren't very good until they're forty."
This dictum was not particularly original. Gordon
Craig, one of Potter's colleagues, was forever making
the same pronouncement in an impolite and sexist
form: "A historian is no damn good until he's forty."
The proverb was, in other words, often uttered in one
form or another within the Stanford history department, and I cannot be sure (I in fact doubt) that it
originated with Potter. Still, when he said it, in his own
humbly eloquent way, the dictum somehow carried
more authority.
My responses to this proverb have naturally varied
over the years. When I first heard it in my twenties,
I thought it was arbitrary and silly, a restricted application of the more general and equally dubious suggestion that wisdom comes with age. Then, in my thirties, I came to regard it as a source of consolation. I
believed that I was "no damn good," but I had an excuse. Who could fault me for not being forty? I am
now over forty, so I can be faulted for my inadequacies as a historian. So I have naturally now
grown "more philosophical" about this whole business.
Just what is the wisdom behind the judgment that
the quality of one's historical thinking somehow improves with age, reaching a kind of watershed at age
forty? Some obvious truths come to mind here. Practice does, in some sense or another, make perfect. The
more I write history, the better I get at it. Then there
is the sheer accumulation of information that I can
draw upon, of theories that I can consider, scholarship
that I can absorb, and models that I can follow. There
is, in other words, something like a quantitative dimension to the process of intellectual growth.
But there is also a more important and moral di6

mension to intellectual maturation within any
humanistic discipline. And this dimension extends far
beyond the narrow domain of what is sometimes called
"professional ethics." I have in mind here criticism
that I have received or that I have repeatedly levelled
at myself regarding my thinking about, say, William
James, a figure long dead. "You have really not done
James full justice in your discussion of his religious
views." Or again, "you really need to be more charitable to James in your analysis of his courtship and marriage." The vocabulary of moral virtue-here justice
and charity-insinuates itself into reflections about
thinking as well as reflections about action.

Just what is the wisdom behind the
judgment that the quality of one's
historical thinking somehow improves
with age, reaching a kind of
watershed at age forty? Some obvious
truths come to mind here.
Herein lies the rub. For it seems peculiar to suggest
that moral growth of one kind or another is directly
related to the quality of scholarly or artistic achievements. Indeed, most of us are prone to think otherwise. Some would wish to distinguish sharply between
moral and intellectual virtues. Others would instantly
multiply examples of human beings who were allegedly despicable persons, but great critics, historians,
poets, or philosophers. Was it not Yeats who taught us
that we must choose "perfection of the work" or "perfection of the life"?
In order fully to appreciate the force and wisdom of
Potter's dictum, we must perhaps be prepared to consider, first, the possibility that the cultivation of certain
moral virtues might lead to better thinking about certain subjects, and, second, that some moral virtues
gain strength over time. If I have grown to treat my
fellow human beings with justice and charity, am I
more or less apt to treat my historical subjects in the
same manner? I am surely more apt to do so. And
would such treatment increase or decrease the quality
of my historical thinking? Again, I think that the exercise of justice and charity toward my historical subjects
is bound to make me a better historian-more cautious
in appraisal, more sympathetic with human failings,
less prone to stereotype and caricature.
For these reasons, I think that it is misguided to
suggest that someone or another is a vicious person
but a good humanistic scholar. Pascal overstated the
case when he said, "Thought is the whole dignity of
The Cresset

man; therefore, think well, for that is the only morality." But he is a useful corrective to Yeats. We do not
do our scholarship in one place and live our lives in
another.
But do human beings become more virtuous with
age? Not necessarily; indeed, human beings probably
become more vicious as often as they become more
virtuous. Still, life itself might well enlarge our
capacities for, say, kindliness and patience. And our
accumulated experience with others and ourselves,
most especially our suffering and our inner sense of
human limitations, might well extend the range if not
the depth of our sympathies. So there is some sense
or another in which living well over time is connected
to thinking better over time about the subject matter
of the humanities.
Potter was wise, I think, in not attempting to specify
the precise nature of that connection. A person needs
much else besides moral excellence in order to become
a good, much less a great, student of the humanities.
I nevertheless believe that living well is more apt to
improve the quality of one's humanistic scholarship
than improving one's humanistic scholarship is apt to
make one a better human being. I add my personal
and self-evident corollary to Potter's wisdom: "Historians aren't very good until they're forty, but goodness
of any kind is still comparatively rare even after forty."

tist fallacy, he also managed to notice and then to correct many other more subtle and systemic errors in
historical reasoning that stem from hindsight. And he
did so, not by overcoming hindsight altogether, but by
restricting its influence upon him in such a way that
he could use it to his advantage. He understood that,
however perilous hindsight might be, one cannot escape it. And he therefore argued that the historian's
awareness of the past is inevitably discrepant, consisting of at least two discrete perspectives at once-the
perspective of the historical subjects, which the historian can occupy only through disciplined effort, and
the historian's own perspective, which he or she occupies naturally .
So, for example, Potter did not choose to concentrate upon the period in American history extending
from 1846 to 1861 because he accidentally grew fond
of the mid-nineteenth century. He chose to study that
period because he knew, by virtue of hindsight, that it
ended with the outbreak of the American Civil War.
He nevertheless began Chapter VII of The Impending
Crisis by contrasting the manner in which other historians had interpreted the 1850s with his own emerging
treatment of the same period. "Hindsight, the historian's chief asset and his main liability, has enabled all
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III
"If historians had a little more foresight and a little
less hindsight, we'd all be better off by a damnsight."
This maxim was quintessential Potter. All historians
are to some degree or another sworn enemies of
hindsight, but Potter fought a fierce and relentless war
against it. And the intellectual strategies that he employed against hindsight gave his teaching and his
writing their distincti:ve character. He must have
known this . He reserved the use of the word "damn"
to statements that dealt in some way or another with
the problem of hindsight.
All historians guard against the dreaded "presentist
fallacy," a kind of wholesale version of the post hoc,
ergo propter hoc argument. Historians know that John
Locke was not preparing the way for or "anticipating"
the American Revolution, regardless of the extent to
which the American colonists might later have used his
teachings to justify their behavior. Even if a historian
wishes to argue that the American Revolution was in
part a consequence of Locke's teachings, he or she
cannot sensibly suggest that Locke intended such a
consequence. Unless, of course, the historian in question is bewitched by hindsight.
Potter not only managed utterly to avoid the presenMarch, 1988

The Question
Of the Ordination
Of Women
The Cresset was pleased to publish the position
papers of T heodore Jungkuntz and Walter E.
Keller on "The Question of the Ordination of
Women" in its regular pages.
In response to reader interest, the Cresset is
furth er pleased to announce that reprints of both
position papers in one eight-page folio are now
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historical writers to know that the decade of the fifties
terminated in a great civil war. Knowing it, they have
consistently treated the decade not as a segment of
time with a character of its own, but as a prelude to
something else. By the very term 'ante-bellum' they
have diagnosed a whole period in the light of what
came after."
By contrast, Potter proceeded to treat the 1850s both
as "a segment of time with a character of its own" and
as a prelude to the Civil War, a task that he managed
brilliantly through the device of ironic emplotment.
Indeed, irony might well be called the trope of discrepant awareness. Potter neither invented irony nor was
he by any means the first, much less the only, historian who used irony to great effect. But Potter was the
supreme ironist, precisely because of his relentless determination to avoid the abuses of hindsight.

David Potter neither invented irony
nor was he by any means the first ,
much less the only, historian to use
irony to great effect. But Potter was
the supreme ironist, precisely because
of his relentless determination to
avoid the abuses of hindsight.
Potter's cunning deployment of irony consistently
enriched his historical analysis. The aforementioned
Chapter VII , for example, is about the notorious
Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, the measure that overthrew earlier guarantees of freedom north of 36°30'
by substituting popular sovereignty for the provisions
of the Missouri Compromise as a way of settling the
question of slavery in the territorities. But Potter did
not give this chapter the expected title, "The KansasNebraska Act." Instead, he entitled it "A Railroad
Promotion and Its Sequel."
The latter title focused attention primarily upon the
intentions and preoccupations of men like Stephen A.
Douglas who were not, during most of 1853, plotting
to circumvent the Missouri Compromise. The chapter
proceeded to render a dramatic and convincing account of how Douglas and other like-minded railroad
boosters found, late in 1853, that they needed Southern votes in order to build a Northern railroad.
Driven by their desire fo r gain, obsessed with the idea
of a trans-continental railroad, some of these men
thought to placate certain powerful Southerners by repealing the Missouri Compromise.
But it was left to Douglas eventually to formulate a
"remarkable fiction," according to which the Missouri
8

Compromise had already been repealed by the Compromise of 1850. "Instead of merely claiming that the
Missouri settlement had been inadvertently removed
four years before by men who did not know what they
were doing-which would itself have strained credulity-he made, in effect, the more stunning claim that
this crucial political action had been taken knowingly
and yet without a contest by men who did not even
bother to discuss what they were doing."
The remarkable achievement of this chapter is that
it leads readers to sympathize with Douglas, even
though they might well deplore the results of his actions and deride the tormented logic of his arguments.
It shows, better than most historical writings, how
something that makes little or no sense in strictly
analytical terms can make perfect sense in narrative
terms. And Potter insists upon both of these things, not upon
one of them to the exclusion of the other. By virtue of the
shrewd manipulation of his discrepant awareness of
the past, Potter explained the Kansas-Nebraska Act
ironically: "few events have swung American history
away from its charted course so suddenly or so sharply, yet the act accomplished nothing that anyone intended and a great deal that no one intended."
Again, Potter's ironic viewpoint was not unique, but
his manipulation of it was. And it informed, even
perhaps evoked, a greater gift that he possessed, one
suggested by the word "foresight," but really a capacity
for retrodiction-practical wisdom applied to the past.
Sir Isaiah Berlin has best described this gift as "knowledge of the inevitable: of what, given our world order,
could not but happen; and conversely, of how things
cannot be, or could not have been, done; of why some
schemes must, cannot help but, end in failure, although for this no demonstrative or scientific reason
can be given. The rare capacity for seeing this we
rightly call a 'sense of reality'-it is a sense of what fits
with what, of what cannot exist with what; and it goes
by many names: insight, wisdom, practical genius, a
sense of the past, an understanding of life and human
character."
Whatever we may choose to call this virtue, Potter
indicated at least two things that are related to it in
ways that are impossible to formu late exactly: a comparatively long life, and vigilant opposition to the evils
of hindsight.
IV

"Gold is where you find it." Potter did not coin this
phrase, but he applied it within a context that is of
vital importance to young scholars today. He had written a historiographical article on the history of the
South, an article that he had concluded with a
The Cresset

metaphor that seemed both strained and puzzling to a
number of us graduate students. "There are plenty of
nuggets yet to be mined in the streambed of Southern
history," he had written. Just what did he mean by
"nuggets"? we wondered.
He did not mean "materials." He was not so old
fashioned as to think of historians as researchers
whose primary task was to fill gaps in the historical record. Indeed, he rejected the "you-take-Texas-youtake-Georgia-I'll-take-Alabama-and-pretty-soon-we'llput-them-all-together-and-have-a-history-of-the-Confederacy" approach to historical scholarship. If by
"nuggets" he did not mean materials, then perhaps he
meant "methods"?

Knowing where you stand and what you
care for and why: self-knowledge, more
than anything else, places the young
student of the humanities in a
position to find gold. But of course
he or she may nonetheless fail to
find gold for countless reasons.
Indeed, we graduate students hoped that Potter did
mean to suggest that there were many new methods to
be mined, even though this notion would have
strained his metaphor beyond reason . Methods in the
streambed of Southern history? How can one mine a
method? In the midst of questions such as these, Potter chose to "clarify" matters by responding to all of
them with the aphorism, "Gold is where you find it."
We resented this aphorism, in part because we
thought of it as a cute evasion, in part because we
found the burden of historical thinking somehow
thrust back upon us in a way that we were not prepared to shoulder. We preferred to think of graduate
school as a place where we would be given fashionable
techniques, say, statistical analysis, that we could then
apply to fashionable subjects, say, social mobility. We
had overcome the primitive view of history as a science
that gathers, stores, and organizes information, only to
adopt the more modern and equally dubious view of
history as a science that tests new hypotheses and
methods in the social sciences.
In other words, the most troublesome word in the
proverb "gold is where you find it" was not the word
"gold" but the word "you." We believed that the profession somehow found the gold. We came to graduate
school to be equipped with the proper tools for mining it. We wanted to be given a hammer, so that we
could then proceed to construe the past as a thing to

March, 1988

be pounded. Potter wanted to instill in us the capacity
to formulate questions and problems (at last the meaning of "nuggets") that would engage both our sympathies and our interests, so that we could then determine for ourselves whether or not we needed hammers or saws or wrenches in order to explore them.
Young scholars then and today seem determined,
however, to lead the life of the mind backwards, to
find subjects to fit either pre-established methods or
fashionable professional preoccupations. And up to a
point scholarly life must be lived this way, in accordance with certain academic imperatives. Potter sought
to correct this inevitable tendency of the academy by
urging us to live life the other way around, to prefer
a life devoted to the pursuit of historical understanding to a life devoted primarily to methodological disputation. He would have agreed, I think, with J.G.A.
Pocock, who once observed that disputes between rival
methods are tiresome and pointless because they reduce finally to some form or another of the charge,
"You should really be doing what I am doing."
Knowing where you stand and what you care for
and why: self-knowledge, more than anything else,
places the young student of the humanities in a position to find gold. But of course he or she may
nonetheless fail to find gold for countless reasonsfatigue, sloppy research, and, yes, faulty or inappropriate methodology among them. Self-knowledge may
be a necessary but it is surely not a sufficient condition
for sound scholarship. There is, however, an additional consideration here. Even if your work turns out
to be comparatively undistinguished, it will, if it stems
from self-knowledge, at least be, in a vitally important
sense, your own. In today's world, to do a piece of
scholarship that is really and truly your own is by itself
no small achievement.

v
At least some of Potter's advice must have been subliminally present in my consciousness while I was
flunking my shower many years ago. Being over forty
and being "really damn good," my senior colleague
had me at a considerable disadvantage. Thus, when he
insisted finally that Allan Nevins was the best historian
of the preceding generation, I, being under forty, deferred to his judgment. But now I know that he was
wrong and I was, doubtless by accident, right. I am
over forty now, still not much good as a historian, but
better able to recognize true greatness when I see it,
which is perhaps the second-best thing. Allan Nevins
was indisputably more prolific than Potter, but Potter
was by far the better historian. And we are all to some
extent, I hope, the better for Potter's advice.
Cl
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Gregory D. Alles

TRANSMISSION AND TRANSFORMATION
Reflections on Translating Joachim Wach

Recalling the emigration of German scholars to
America in the early 1930s, Erwin Panofsky, the art
historian, once wrote: "There are more words in our
philosophy than are dreamt of in heaven and earth,
and every German-educated art historian endeavoring
to make himself understood in English had to make
up his own dictionary. In doing so, he realized that his
native terminology was often either unnecessarily recondite or downright imprecise; the German language
unfortunately permits a fairly trivial thought to declaim from behind a woolen curtain of apparent profundity and , conversely, a multitude of meanings to
lurk behind one term. . . . [But] when speaking or
writing English, even an art historian must more or
less know what he means and mean what he says, and
this was exceedingly wholesome for all of us ."'
Perhaps Panofsky was a little hard on his own past.
Masters of communication can and do clothe the trivial with profundity in every language, including English. But Panofsky's comments have a special relevance for me. I have been translating selected works
written in the 1920s by a German scholar of religions,
Joachim Wach.
The circumstances to which Panofsky alludes forced
Wach himself to translate his thought into English.
The Nazis did not overlook Wach's ancestors. He was
a descendant of Felix Mendelssohn and thus of Moses
Mendelssohn, the Jewish Enlightenment philosopher.
When Wach lost his job at the University of Leipzig in
1935, he came to America to teach , first at Brown,

Gregory D. Alles teaches in the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies at Western Maryland College. He
earned a B.A. degree in Classics at Valparaiso University, an
M.Div. at the Lutheran School of Theology at Chicago, and
a Ph.D. in the History of Religions at the Divinity School of
the University of Chicago. Before taking his present position,
he taught at Valparaiso University and at Southwestern Missouri State University.
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then at the University of Chicago. At Chicago, he established a program in the "history of religions" that
would become better-known through the activities of
his pupil, Joseph Kitagawa, and his successor, the late
Mircea Eliade.

Wach never abandoned the directions
his thoughts had taken in Germany.
He sought to elucidate "religion"all religions-with the tools of
a general rather than a special
(i.e., theological) hermeneutics.
Wach never abandoned the directions his thought
had taken in Germany. He sought to elucidate "religion"-all religions-with the tools of a general rather
than a special (i.e., theological) hermeneutics, and he
viewed "objective" religion as the expression of religious experience. But in translating his thought for the
American audience, Wach had to transform it. In Germany he had talked mostly about talki ng; in America
he talked more about religion. In Germany Wach vehemently argued that his discipline did not belong in a
theological facu lty; in America Wach took up theological subjects himself. T he degree to which translation
into English required transformation- and the degree
to which Wach failed-can be seen in the most basic
nomenclature. Wach-and Kitagawa after him-have
never found a satisfactory English designation for the
program Wach advocated in Germany: Religionswissenschaft. "History of religions" was a poor second-best.
The decision to translate Wach's German works thus
involves the translator in an inevitable paradox, firs t of
all because one is being asked to do what Wach himself could not do. The paradox is most pronounced,
'Erwin Panofsky, Meaning in the Visual Arts: Papers in and
on Art History (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1955), pp. 329-330.
The Cresset

perhaps, in the work over which I have labored the
most: Religionswissenschaft: Prolegomena zu ihrer wissenschaftstheoretische Grundlegung. The title defies precise translation.
The book was written in 1924, for Wach's Habilitation at the age of 26, and the signs of youth are difficult to miss. Wach himself apologized in the Preface
for the book's stylistic flaws .2 The organization is
rough and uneven. There are paragraphs that consist
of nothing more than generic topic headings that
Wach failed to develop. The writing is at times stiff,
rigid, and downright pedantic. And, like many young
writers, Wach wastes a great deal of space disputing in
detail the views of his better-known, older contemporaries. Some had names that are still remembered,
such as Ernst Troeltsch and Max Scheler; others, like
Cornelis Tiele and Heinrich Scholz, have joined the
nameless ancestors.
These failings of youth are not fatal, but other
characteristics make adequate translation impossible.
Wach is writing academic German to impress-that is,
to befuddle-fellow academics. At times his syntax is
so convoluted that he literally seems to say the precise
opposite of what his entire argument demands. His
language is always abstract, and rather than trying to
dispel the clouds that gather around the peaks, Wach
seems to enjoy the fog. One sentence merges into
another with the help of references that are rarely
precise: "Here," "In this [regard]," and so on-"and so
on" is a phrase that Wach repeats ad nauseam. Worse
yet, when Wach's style is not stiff and pedantic, it errs
on the side of quasi-mystical enthusiasm. Apparently
mindful of his pedigree, Wach is continually paraphrasing and alluding to librettos and musical lyrics,
or so Karl Luckert, my native German collaborator,
tells me.
The youthful character of Wach's undertaking gives
me the strange feeling that I have been called upon to
tidy up unfinished business. Religionswissenschaft should
not have been published so hastily at the age of 26. If
Wach had to publish it so young, he ought to have
given it at least one more massive revision. To translate it-to make it mean what it says and say what it
2

"Some may find my style and procedure too formal and
abstract. I hope they will recognize that, by proceeding as
I do, I am able to formulate decisive questions, hint at
solutions, point to connections, and point out new ways
of furthering concrete research .... I will be attempting
throughout this study to elucidate and argue for certain
important principles. Because the various problems that I
discuss are interconnected, I feel that this somewhat repetitive procedure is justified."-Joachim Wach, Introduction to the History of Religions, ed. Joseph M. Kitagawa and
Gregory D. Alles (New York: Macmillan, 1987), p. 5.
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means in English-! have had to do what Wach left
undone. I have had to revise: to polish sentences and
finish thoughts. But translation only permits a limited
amount of revision. I am not entirely happy with the
result.
If Panofsky's diagnosis is correct, however, the
biggest problem involves not the signs of youth but the
symptoms of disease. That disease called for more
than a translation of Wach's words. It required a complete transformation of his thought in the more salubrious climate west of the Atlantic. I then find myself
in a considerably more uncomfortable position. I am
not called upon to complete what Wach left unfinished; I am condemned to doing only half of what
is needed. I am condemned to trying to make Wach's
German speak English, when to make complete sense
it would be necessary for Wach himself to (try to)
speak English. Worse yet, I must try to make Wach's
German speak English when Wach himself did in fact
speak English, but found it necessary to think different thoughts to do so, at least, to do so intelligibly.
How can I make Wach entirely clear, when parts of
the book were intended to be obscure? How can I
overcome the vertigo and mystification of the abstract,
when the original author delighted in being dizzy and
expected the same reaction from his readers? How can
I express in English Wach's demand for a discipline
that cannot even be named in English? And what
about the constant musical allusions?
Oddly enough, it is in this middle ground of translation-flawed translation devoid of transformationthat I see the most promise of success.
II

In a recent short story, "Events at Drimaghleen,"
William Trevor contrasts two modes of responding to
tragedy. 3 A young girl, her fiance (a man of questionable character), and her fiance's mother are found
dead. In dealing with the shock, the girl's family, their
neighbors in Drimaghleen (a small Irish village), and
the local authorities reconstruct the tragic events: the
girl was murdered. Months later, reporters from a
London newspaper carefully sift the evidence to refute
the local story. They bribe the girl's grieving parents
into granting an interview and then publish a lurid account, proving that the girl was not the victim but the
killer. We are left with the local priest trying to console the outraged and devastated mother: trying to
reassert the credibility of the local reconstruction of
the events.
It is difficult not to read Trevor's -story in terms of
3

Grand Street 6, no. 2 (Winter 1987): 39-56.
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two different manners of constructing acceptable narratives about the past: two different manners of telling
history. One is local and primarily oral. It is based on
first-hand knowledge of the participants and their
general characters, and it provides an account of
events to facilitate life in the community where the
events occurred. The second is distanced and primarily literate. It is based on a careful, rational sifting of
the evidence, and it details "what actually happened"
for the "enjoyment" of readers. It has no regard for
the effect that the account will have on the community
that remains. The readers of "Events at Drimaghleen"
are stretched between these two poles. From the beginning we notice clues that the local historians overlook, but the newspaper report leaves us with a foul
aftertaste, a feeling of nausea.

The published accounts of Wach's life
and work are all written by persons
who have a personal stake in Wach's
memory. They present "the truth"
about Wach: a scholar as his own
academic communities remember him.
The correlations between local and oral and between
literate and impersonal make so much sense intuitively
that we tend to think they are universal. But in Wach's
case, the position of oral and literate histories is the reverse of that in Trevor's story. The published accounts
of Wach's life and work are all written by persons who
have a personal stake in Wach's memory. They present "the truth" about Wach: a scholar as his own communities (the Universities of Leipzig and Chicago) remember him, a Wach that scholars can live with. But
outside these communities, others preserve in their
memories and occasionally convey orally a somewhat
different Wach, a Wach who invites us to modify the
received reconstruction. I met this "oral Wach" in a
community that I associate not so much with "truth"
as with "reality," with marriage, hunger, birth, and
death.
"Ah, my dear, do people still read Wach? I was a
student in Leipzig in the early '30s when Wach was
teaching there." I had mentioned my translation project to A. A. had himself just come out with a small
book on Stefan George. Wach was a member of the
George circle, wasn't he? "That I don't know. He
could have been. He had his own circle of sorts at
Leipzig. He was always surrounded by a group of
young men, very handsome young men; never women.
For you know, my dear, Wach was shtrictly gay." A.
12

spoke this final cadence with a flourish born from
years on the stage. He tilted his head back slightly,
raised his right hand, and squinted his eyes. The
rolled "r," in fact the entire italicized syllable, seemed
to last forever. His left hand tightly gripped my
forearm. Had he known Wach? "No, dear. I wouldn't
say that I knew him exactly. Oh, I was at his house
once or twice when he would have a group of students
over. But I didn't know him really. Why should I have?
Religion was not my field. And then, well, let us just
say that I was not Wach's type. Coming from the east
[somewhere in eastern Europe], I was a little short; I
had dark hair, thin legs, and to be honest, my dear,
I was not myself particularly handsome as a young
man. Wach preferred tall boys-tall, beautiful, blond
boys. I heard that when the Nazis took over, Wach
took the most beautiful of these boys, Horst Matthaus,
to Switzerland with him. Wach's family had a summer
home in Switzerland ." Several days later A. gave me a
picture postcard of Wach, a formal 3/4 portrait that
was sold at Leipzig University in the early '30s. "You
know, my dear, I really don't know why I saved
Wach's picture all these years. I found it in one of my
books. You should have it. Wach means more to you
than he does to me." I keep the postcard on my desk .
The other account of Wach came from a man--call
him B.-who had belonged to Wach's inner circle in
America-the "Samgha"-but who had become distanced from the "official" community after Wach 's
death . Not only had B. been Wach's student, he wrote
his dissertation on Wach. "Wach was basically a spoiled
rich kid . His family had money from banking. So,
while other students stayed in one place and studied,
Wach drove all over Germany in a new Mercedes
Benz. Whenever he found out that some big name was
going to give a public lecture, Wach drove over and
took it in. He came to know all the hottest topics, and
he knew how to play his cards." B. lent me a copy of
his dissertation, which "presents quite a different picture from the Wach you learned at Chicago."
Oral accounts are notoriously difficult to assess. I do
not even claim that I have remembered every detail of
these conversations correctly. But both have one point
in common: they both urge us to consider the broader
context of Wach's thought in Germany.
From our post-Nazi vantage point, we are bound to
wonder where Wach's political commitments lay. Was
he a Vernunftrepublikaner, like Troeltsch and Friedrich
Meinecke, a supporter of the Weimar republic out of
necessity but not out of conviction; or was he a
member of that "caste which had become redundant
and was doing its best to poison the political climate,"
the "families which under the monarchy had provided
the manpower for the middle and higher ranks of ofThe Cresset

ficialdom"? 4
Wach is reputed to have been liberal, cosmopolitan,
and eirenic-and, if A. is correct, homosexual. But his
family was both wealthy-Hitler confiscated their estate overlooking the Elbe near Dresden-and wellplaced. Wach's grandfather was a jurist, Joachim's
senior colleague on the Leipzig faculty . His father had
been the comptroller for food in Germany during
World War I. An aunt of his lived at the Swedish
court, and the Wachs were family friends of the Saxon
king. The disciplines that Wach refers to the mosthistory, law, German philosophy, and Protestant theology-were bastions of the staunchest monarchicalism.
In addition, Wach's distant involvement with the
prophet of the ethereal "neue Reich" (George) and his
participation in that Weimar oddity, the "German
youth movement" (eventually a right-wing advance
guard out of ignorance), 5 also look suspicious.
•Walter Laqueur, Weimar: A Cultural History 1918-1933
(New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1974), pp. 186-187.

Notre Dame
Inside Notre Dame the organist
practiced for a recital. Four nuns
spread arms to capture children who
threatened to escape into long shadows.
The talk was hushed but not quiet and we
waited for the presence.
You coughed and motioned to my hat
and the glass box containing coins,
and the two old women, bonneted and bent
moving toward the holy water fount, jostled
by the crowd, separated, as they strained
against the bodies that swelled around
the large black doors, until one stretched
and touched the water and reached across me,
the water beads pendant from her finger tips,
as the people surged towards the blazing altar
beneath the stained glass, caught in the sensuous
music of the chant. Then I found your hand
and took you out, out in the bright Paris day
where we watched the pigeons flare up from
the flying buttresses and melt into
the golden sun.

J. T. Ledbetter
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I cannot help feeling that if I had a more precise
idea of Wach's politics, I might be able to turn it to
good advantage. But for the present, I must limit my
remarks to the writings that I have translated. To what
extent do they reflect the trends and fads of Weimar
Germany? The major themes are certainly suggestive,
as B.'s comments would lead us to suspect.
(1) Wach forcefully insisted that Religionswissenschaft
is an empirical discipline. He rejected both the normative concerns of theology and the subjective slant of
"psychologism.'' 6 When the Prolegomena was published in 1924, expressionism-itself a "psychologism"
of sorts-had just run its course and demands were
being raised for a Neue Sachlichkeit, a "new objectivity"-demands not altogether unrelated to Germany's
new-found economic and political stability after the
runaway inflation of 1921-1923.
(2) Wach relentlessly urged "totality" upon his readers, in opposition to the "atomizing analysis" of the
positivists. His discipline was to study religion as a
whole; a historian, he said, must understand the
phenomenon in its entirety. Weimar culture in general
5
0f the youth movement (basically romantic, right-wing
boy scouts), Otto Friedrich writes: "In 1896 ... a twentyone year old youth ... organized a group dedicated to
self-improvement through the practice of shorthand ....
[Five years later] ten of his associates gathered at a Steglitz tavern, drew up a constitution for their hiking society,
and named themselves the Wandervogel. . . . They saluted each other with the word 'Heil.'" The movement
grew rapidly. At a convention in 1913, tens of thousands
of Wandervogel "lit bonfires, sang songs, recited Goethe,
[and] listened to speeches on the German spirit. ... The
Wandervogel were not originally a political movementexcept to the extent that the wandering youths already
shared certain political views, ranging from an emotional
patriotism to an equally emotional mistrust of Jews (and
girls)." After the war, the movement was more fragmented and more politicized. Cp. Otto Friedrich, Before
the Deluge: A Portmit of Berlin in the 1920s (New York:
Avon, 1972), pp. 261-262. Many of the details of Wach's
family are buried in a speech that Robert Carey (then of
Cambridge) gave at Wach's memorial service, printed in
The Divinity School News (University of Chicago) 22, no. 4
(November 1, 1955), pp. 32-33.
6
"Psychologism" denotes any attempt to explore religion
entirely in terms of internal, psychological phenomena.
In positivistic form, psychologism treats the religious object as a [generally pathological] projection. Against
positivistic psychologism, Wach set Max Scheler, who insisted that to understand a religious experience one could
not ignore or explain away its "intentional object."
Against psychologism in general, Wach insisted that external forms--das objektive Geist-have structures of their
own that can and must be comprehended, not simply as
"expressions" but in relative independence from
psychological experience.
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seems to have been enchanted by "totality," from
Lukacs' "orthodox Marxism," Gropius' "total architecture," and Piscator's "total theater" to Gestalt psychology and those who-perhaps with the least self-deception-saw republican government as a reflection of uncultured Anglo-French individualism and longed toreturn to the wholeness and unity of the German
monarchy.
(3) Wach proposed a new academic pursuit that he
called the "formal systematization" of religion . The
task of this subdiscipline was to identify abstract religious forms devoid of any particular historical content.
His proposal reminds one of Weimar plays whose
characters have generic designations instead of names,
of paintings that locate beauty not in accidental content but abstract form, and of the Bauhaus, which reduced buildings to essential forms devoid of superfluous, concrete ornamentation.
(4) Sociology was the hottest topic in Weimar
academic circles. It receives special acclaim in Wach's
Prolegomena, and to his dying day Wach remained
above all a sociologist of religion.
(5) In other writings from the period (some of
which I have also translated) Wach defines religion in
terms of salvation and a savior. This emphasis looks
uncomfortably like a sacralization of the contemporary
longing for a Fuhrer and political deliverance-the
concern for Heil that made the Wandervogel such easy
prey for right-wing ideologues-or else like a staunch
Lutheranism (devoid of its particular historical content) of which "German eschatological monarchicalism" was but a slight secularization.'
The volume that contains Trevor's short story about
Drimaghleen also contains a frank if controversial
commentary on the theological enterprise: a critique
of Reinhold Niebuhr by Noam Chomsky. Niebuhr,
Chomsky maintains, was not really a thinker. He was
too inattentive to facts, and he did not attempt to provide convincing arguments for his positions. Instead,
Niebuhr always remained a preacher who had a gift
for clothing contemporary problems and intellectual
fads with religious language. This, Chomsky asserts,
was the secret of Niebuhr's enormous influence and
success."
Wach's influence was never so enormous as
Niebuhr's, and in proposing a Religions"wissenschaft",
' Max Scheler, a Catholic phenomenologist who profoundly influenced Wach , clearly sacralized this longing. In the
opening of his article, "Fuhrer und Vorbilder," he wrote
(to paraphrase) : Today everyone is asking, Who will be
our Fuhrer? The real question is, Who will provide the
Vorbild?

"Noam Chomsky, "Reinhold Niebuhr," Grand Street 6, no.
2 (Winter 1987): 197-212.
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Wach tried to shield himself from the kinds of political
criticism that Niebuhr's ethical assertions invite. As an
empirical discipline, Wach said, Religionswissenschaft is
independent of all normative positions. Its practitioners serve neither theology, philosophy, nor politics.
Wach would apparently have us believe that only the
logic and substance of what we say should be important. His biographers have learned this lesson well.
They treat Wach's contributions as if they simply addressed some problem or other in the logical development of the history of religions-informed, of course,
by the profound advantages of Wach's noble family
heritage.
Wach may not have preached in the "normative"
sense, but like Chomsky's Niebuhr, at any rate, he offered few genuine arguments for his positions. He
often simply contradicted the views of others and then
asserted his own. I have no idea how widely Wach was
read in the "golden twenties," but I have begun to suspect that whatever influence and success he may have
enjoyed at the time was due primarily to the trendiness of his observations. In Religionswissenschaft, Wach
seems to have picked up and elaborated several significant Weimar themes, themes with which he could
have expected a significant portion of his audience to
agree without hesitation-without thought. If he did
so, he would not be at all unusual.

III
I do not expect a large "audience" for my translation: acquisitions librarians, a handful of graduate students, a handful of the old guard-perhaps a few
others. And I would not presume to estimate the effect the translation will have on the future course of
the study of religions. It is more interesting, I think,
to consider the conditions under which the book
would be received the best.
Translation, as I have practiced it, is not transformation. It is not an alchemy that creates new thought out
of old. It is more like transmission . It conveys old
thought in a different medium. And as transmission,
translation does not belong to a work's "effect." It is
a moment in its "after-effect." These differences are
crucial.
Today, Wach's effect has run its course. B. indirectly
echoed A.'s initial amazement that I was translating
Wach . "In Germany I picked up a volume of Das Verstehen [Wach's three-volume survey of nineteenthcentury hermeneutics] for a quarter. Nobody there
reads Wach anymore." Wach shares this fate with
many of his generation. Twelve years of Nazi rule irreparably altered the peculiar constellation of forces
and trends that produced Weimar culture. Walter
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Laqueur writes: "After the war, the problems and the
preoccupations of the Weimar intelligentsia seemed remote if not incomprehensible.''•
In America, Wach's effect was never so great as, say,
Eliade's. Americans cannot be expected to get excited
about a discipline they cannot even name, and Wach's
sweeping generalizations contained too little of the
concrete detail that most of us look for in scholarship.
Wach's (partially) transformed thought had its largest
impact on his students. But their later comments-and
their scholarly publications-seem to indicate that
Wach's force derived as much from his personality as
from what he had to say, and today Wach's students
are themselves pushing retirement.
That Wach's effect would wane was inevitable. Like
clothes and food and heavy metal music, scholarship is
largely a matter of fads. It reflects Marshall Sahlins'
view of fashion. A creative and influential book-a
fashionable book-is one that presents the customary
with a new look. It gives a new twist to the familiar,
so that it contains just enough of the unfamiliar and
different to fascinate, but not enough to repel. 10
Today, Wach is simply out of style.
But what one hopes to avoid in a book's "effect"
may be desirable in its "after-effect." A translation-at
least one kind of translation-is valuable because it allows the audience to encounter what is not fashionable
and familiar. It grants new life to a once-successful
work (or a work successful elsewhere) by exploiting
conditions that would impede its success if published
as an original. Despite the conscious intentions of
translators from at least Luther on, translation does
not so much transform-make the foreign familiar-as
transmit--convey the foreign, as foreign, into the
realm of the familiar. A translation is most valuable
when it presents difference with just enough of the
familiar to make confrontation possible: familiar
words, familiar patterns of expression, what would appear to be familiar intellectual contexts.
Thus, the quote from Panofsky with which I began
actually raised the wrong question. When a translator's
conscious intentions confront a book like Wach's,
which so stubbornly resists familiarization, intense
Laqueur, p. 271. Of the late Weimar revival, he notes:
"Gradually it became clear that there was a growing discrepancy between the real Weimar and the myth of
Weimar. ... Some reputations were inflated out of all
proportion ... because [some writers and artists] had had
the good fortune either to survive in the right place, or
because good friends were pushing their cause. Others
were less fortunate, as their work did not suit the fashions of the 1960s" (p. 276).
0
' Marshall Sahlins, Culture and Practical Reason (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1976).
9
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anxiety may result. But this anxiety is misplaced. The
real question is not: What am I to do if I cannot make
Wach always say what he means and mean what he
says in English? It is: What can be done with the
foreign that my translation inescapably transmits? A
single, suggestive theme-a typical Weimar themewill serve as my example, pars pro toto.

Like clothes and food and heavy metal
music, scholarship is largely a matter
of fads. It reflects Marshall Sahlins'
view of fashion. A creative and
influential book is one that presents
the customary with a new look.
As already noted, the theme of "totality" recurs
throughout Religionswissenschaft. Explicitly, Wach
situates this theme in its traditional home, hermeneutics: "the spirit of the whole can only be comprehended indirectly, by comprehending the parts,
and all particulars can be fully understood only
through that principle which provides internal coherence"-the notorious "hermeneutical circle."'' But for
all Wach's talk of totality, a full vision of the concept
eludes him. Despite his talk of understanding, he continually exploits "totality" to do something that he
never actually articulates: to critique, especially to
critique "one-sided" psychologism and "atomizing"
positivism. Wach's insistence upon totality breaks the
hermeneutical chains in which it is thematized. His
theory may praise understanding, but his practice
raises the possibility of a "critique from totality" that
has far-reaching implications. Naturally, these implications begin with the current state of Wach's own discipline, the history of religions .' 2
In recent decades, many have come to distinguish
the history of religions from other religious studies by
identifying it with the ideas of a single scholar, Mircea
Eliade. After all, what do "historians of religions" do,
if they do not explore sacred time and space, identify
axeis mundi and unrecognized returns ad origines, and
search for manifestations of other familiar Eliadean
"Wach, p. 38. Wach applies this and other hermeneutical
ideas most concretely in his "Mahayana Buddhism." For
a translation of this article, see Joachim Wach, Essays in
the History of Religions, ed. Joseph M. Kitagawa and Gregory D. Alles (New York: Macmillan, 1987), pp. 33-64.
12
The logical status of the critical use of totality is not entirely clear. For various positions in the twentieth century,
see Martin Jay, Marxism and Totality (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1984).
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themes? The identification of this discipline with
Eliade's ideas is unfortunate. Eliade's particular interpretations and methods are open to severe criticism.
All too frequently they are both superficial and arbitrary. When the inevitable criticism comes, the history
of religions often seems fatally wounded in the crossfire.
A critique from totality inspired by Wach addresses
this situation in two ways. First, it frankly calls Eliade's
enterprise into question. In Religionswissenschaft, Wach
condemns as utterly premature the kinds of comparison that Eliade practices with reckless abandon. In
latching onto similar appearances, Eliade ignores the

The identification of the discipline
of the history of religions with
Eliade's ideas is unfortunate. H is
particular views are open to severe
criticism. All too frequently they
are both superficial and arbitrary.

academic study of all religions from a point of view
not explicitly aligned with any of them. In Religionswissenschaft Wach envisions the history of religions as a
comprehensive hermeneutics of religions (not of the
"Sacred") that in theory avoids Eliade's failings. Of
course, Wach's language was never entirely fluent, and
his concepts now crack with the brittleness of age, but
at least Religionswissenschaft raises the possibility of a
more adequate formulation of this discipline.
Nevertheless, I am convinced that in the end Wach's
insistence on totality must turn against his own hermeneutical slant: religions are always more than religious meanings to be interpreted. A broadened view
of the discipline's subject brings with it a broadened
view of its tasks. A critique from totality drives historians of religions beyond hermeneutical familiarization
and the thematization of foreign meanings (as in one
sense it drove Wach) to the practice of defamiliarization and a broader cultural critique. ••
On this view, the "after-effect" of Religionswissenschaft is riddled with irony, and Wach's model for
the history of religions stands upside down.
IV

total contexts in which these apparent similarities
occur.' ~ He does so partly because he advances a false
totality as a comprehensive paradigm for the history of
religions. That is, Eliade limits religion, or more specifically religious meaning, to the manifestations of
"the Sacred"-what he calls the "dialectics" of the Sacred. Perhaps the most telling failure is Eliade's complete conceptual inability to address the sociological
questions that, true to the Weimar heritage, Wach
pursued so relentlessly.
But in rejecting Eliade's enterprise, this critique does
not automatically reject the history of religions: the
"The following critique is incisive, even if the language is
much too idealistic to be palatable to contemporary tastes:
". .. a great danger to which many historians of religions
succumb: preoccupied with the history of forms, they
forget the essence. Regardless of whether conceptions
and customs, dogmas, myths, and cultic forms travel from
one religion to another or whether they are inherited,
they never remain what they were. The principle that
brought them forth , and from which they live, sustains
them as long as it possesses a 'creative force.' When that
force is extinguished, the forms die. They may well be
claimed by others, but then they mean something different. They occupy a place within another total context.
They stand in a different relationship to the organizing
principle of the new religion."-Wach, Introduction, pp.
60-61. Of course, Wach was critiquing not a shallow morphology but a shallow evolutionism as he knew it most directly in the religionsgeschichtliche Schute: cp. further p.
136.
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I am terribly impressed with the current "high fashion" of writing in the humanities: its titillating wit, its
brilliance, and its dazzling semantic displays. Writers
have ripped words apart and stitched them back together in unaccustomed and unforeseen ways. They
have manipulated traditional and not so traditional
concepts with every rhetorical device until they have
burst forth with unsuspected surpluses of meaning.
Some have feasted so well and so long at the tree of
knowledge that in their satiety they have convinced
themselves and others that the fruit of this tree always
contains the seeds of its own de(con)struction. Rarely
have these scholars been tempted to nibble at the fruit
of the tree of life, even when they have invoked their
favorite Lebensphilosoph, Friedrich Nietzsche. Their virtuoso gymnastics require the isolation of language
from life, the self-sufficiency of discourse, and a notion of truth that repudiates any attempt to mirror reality.
The condition of contemporary scholarship is
symptomatic of the condition of contemporary life. Of
course, the American populace shows a decided preference for the body over the mind and for physical
and material pleasure rather than intellectual amusement. But the same desire for titillation, for brilliance,
and for dazzling display animates, for example, the
14

See my article, "Wach, Eliade, and the Critique from
Totality," forthcoming in Numen.
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current cult of the human physique in all its VICISsitudes. Contemporary life feeds on a concern for immediate, individual profit and pleasure that is, like
much contemporary scholarship, self-directed and selfsufficient. At the root of both lies an analytic reasoning that directs all activity to the manipulation of isolated resources (Wach would say "atomized" resources), whether semantic or monetary, for personal
stimulation and gratification.
The most unfortunate victim of this broad cultural
fashion has been American higher education. During
the last two decades business and professional programs have multiplied in this country at an astounding
rate. Many colleges and universities, driven by a desire
for continued enrollment, have bowed to the whims of
prospective students and surrendered the ideals of
education for a total life that they once espoused.
They have sought instead to sell their customers a simple commodity: training in one or another specialized
branch of manipulative analysis. Alleged defenders of
the liberal arts have recently articulated a very dangerous response to this trend. The liberal arts, they have
claimed, are a better training for achieving professional success than is a degree in business. Such a defense is so lame that one might as well simply surrender.
I am, of course, not the only person whom these
current fashions disturb. Why do they remain viable?
It seems to me that they do so at least in part because
they successfully masquerade as false totalities. In the
general imagination, they represent "what everyone
really wants," "the way things are ." The fashionable
think that contemporary vogues supply all of what is
significant in life. They consider their own aims and
means-be they so paltry as techniques to amass a
small monetary fortune-to be both self-evidently desirable and universally pursued. It is at this point that
the history of religions, practiced as a critique from totality inspired by Wach, can make its own, distinctive
contribution.
First, the history of religions vigorously refutes the
presumed universality of contemporary orders. It
studies "the whole 'world of religion,' " 15 and in doing
so it transmits into the world of the familiar the entire
range of human dreams and aspirations. This discipline knows its share of brilliance and dazzling displays-rituals and beliefs that titillate precisely because
they exude an alluring, exotic scent that the all-toofamiliar Christianity often lacks. But to the material
and hedonistic obsessions of modern life the history of
religions juxtaposes other aims, such as liberation, nirvana, selflessness, salvation, well-being obtained
15
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through integration with natural orders or by obeying
a god's commands. Furthermore, the history of religions counters the manipulative, analytic reasoning
currently fashionable with a world of techniques and
procedures that not infrequently requires the renunciation of all that the devotees of analysis hold most dear.
A genuine encounter with this broader world can be
very sobering. My students are at times rather inarticulate, but they often display an intuitive sense for
the issues: "When we studied Hinduism and Buddhism, I thought they were weird; then we started to
study us, and I realized we're just as weird as they
are." The history of religions defamiliarizes our current presumptions. Contrasted with others, our limited
aims and techniques no longer appear self-evident,
universal, noble, or even all that desirable.
But the history of religions does not limit itself to
setting our views and actions in a more total context.
This discipline also scrutinizes the relations of our own
culture to religion. Our peculiar secularity is not
exactly devoid of religion. I am not making the obvious point that many persons still practice religious traditions, and that some even practice them energetically. I mean to say (with a bow to Eliade as well as
to Wach) that the history of religions can reveal the
extent to which our secularity is itself not exactly devoid of religion. Contemporary patterns of thought,
action, and association are, so to speak, the skeletons
of dead gods, primarily Greek and Near Eastern.
They are fossils of structures and ideals that were once
generated and animated by religion.
My own work, for example, is focusing on a comparison of classical Greece and India. It has sought to
elucidate by contrast the structures of power peculiar
to the religious life of the Greek polis, structures that
still govern the modes of American political interaction
and intellectual activity, including contemporary science and technology. In this way, the history of religions functions as a sort of cultural psychoanalysis. It
recalls to memory what our secularity represses: the
substance that was lost when our gods died, or rather,
the flesh that we flayed from their bones in order to
kill them. In doing so, the history of religions helps reveal the emaciated, attenuated nature of American
life.
Let me be clear. The history of religions does not
issue a call to return to religion, either to one specific
religion or to one among several alternatives. No religion can avoid the defamiliarization of the history of
religions practiced critically. More generally, to support religion-either one religion or religions in general-would violate this discipline's age-old tasks, tasks
that were first announced clearly in Wach's Religionswissenschaft. The history of religions is not a
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covert ally of those who advocate a traditional religion.
Instead, it tempts us to nibble a bit at the tree of life.
To scholars it issues an invitation to abandon not their
brilliance and their wit but their ultimately disappointing narcissism of discourse and "texts" and to reinsert
knowledge into the context of life: it issues a latetwentieth-century call an die Sachen or, perhaps more
appropriately in an article inspired by Wach, to a neue
Sachlichkeit. It invites those who prefer matter over
mind to recall that the appropriate question is not how
to make a living-and more than a living-but how in
the first place it is best for us to live. To echo Wach :
This is a question to which the history of religions
leads, but which it cannot itself address. 16 I prefer to
state the matter more positively. In an era of inevitable
historical and global consciousness, the history of religions prepares the ground so that questions of life
may again be asked with profundity.

v
What precedes is clearly a personal response to a
prolonged encounter with Joachim Wach. It is an
example, an attempt to use some of the foreign that
my translation transmits to transform past thoughtWach's thought-about the history of religions. There
is irony in the way I use Wach. Wach was noted for
being eirenic, for stressing agreement and similarity. I
aim to be critical, to stress distance and differences.
Wach was isolationist, stressing the need to free the
history of religions from the theological, political, a~d
cultural winds by which it had been buffeted. I w1sh
to reinsert the history of religions back into the life of
culture. Wach's history of religions was hermeneutical;
it advocated translation as transformation, a process
that made the foreign as familiar as a dear friend . I
am content with a history of religions that advocates
translation as transmission and uses the foreign to unsettle.
These ironies that arise in the attempt to "translate"
Wach's thought parallel the irony inherent in the project of translating Wach's words. To be successful, a
translation of Religionswissenschaft must violate its own
subject. It is impossible to translate Wach's bo~k. as t~e
book itself demands. I cannot transform Relzgwnswzssenschaft so that it becomes as familiar as a dear, lifelong friend. The most I can do is trans~it Wac~ ' s
thought, partially hiding its foreignness behmd familiar veils. Transformation begins when readers confront the foreign that my veils cannot conceal. It is no
longer something that actually happens to Wach's
thought. It happens to yours and to mine.
Cl

Poems with No Names:
The Sacred Pathway VII
(After Lao Tzu)

12.

The grass is green enough to be blue
And the stone fences, worn down
By time and rain . Only the war horses
Are behind darkbrown fences;
Everything else, open. Trees
Give shade for lovers to picnic.
Old mansions seem as gracious
As the surrounding cottages. The
Folk of the river bottoms
Play tunes on their dulcimers,
While those on the hilltops
Ride their thoroughbreds.
In evening everyone eats his fill,
Old and young, dogs and cats.
The beauty of the land is shared
From the spring thaw
Of the limestone falls to the
Autumn leaves of the distant mountains.
No sword is brandished
Neither are ill words spoken against the poor
Young and old alike live in peace
Die and return to each other's land.

13.
Words are not the way. They may
Point to the way but never
Do they become the way. Listen,
Therefore, with care to the dull
And brilliant alike: the one may
Not be aware what he says yet
Lead you on ; the other may think
He knows what's best and, thereby,
Hold you back.
Listen in earnest, though, to him
Who shares his goods with you,
Who tries to give away all he bargained.
That one is blessed, so is that way.

Travis DuPriest

";Ibid., p. 95.
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We're Number 11
Charles Vandersee
Dear Editor:
We rank # 11, according to U.S.
News & World R eport last fall (Nov.
7).

Nobody knows if these polls
mean much, but there it is: After
Harvard, Yale, and Princeton, and
four state universities (Berkeley,
UCLA, Michigan, North Carolina),
with Duke, Chicago, and Davidson
interspersed, our university here in
Dogwood sends on to the nation 's
law schools their best students. This
according to the deans of the top
schools.
Even though we're only 15th in
the nation in general undergraduate reputation , according to
U.S. News the previous week.
As dean of the undergraduate
scholars program, I see a certain
number of the students who go on
from this university into law school.
Most law schools require a "standard dean's reference form "; this
states that an applicant has or has
not been disciplined by the university, for academic or other reasons.
(These days, one way you get an
official reprimand is to serve beer
at graduate happy hour, as did one
underage young woman last summer.)
The dean's form also wants to

Charles Vandersee is Dean of the
Echols Scholars Program, in its 28th
year, at the University of Virginia.
March, 1988

know class rank, year by year. Also,
the rigor of the student's academic
program, and how much writing
the student did . So I ask students
to supply some information, and
then come in for a formal followup interview, which typically lasts a
half hour.
The dean's form has one final
open-ended question, asking about
the applicant's "capacity for professional law study." For that I go to
the student's official file and to my
interview notes. I like, when possible, to talk about a student's unbroken line of achievement from secondary school onward, with emphasis on real distinctions rather
than just performance of assigned
tasks.
Why tell you all this? By way of
getting to some information. With
too little time to do everything
worth doing, we tend to think
about the future more than the
past-for those students who really
want law school, let's help them
along. Only later, if time, find out
where they got in and what they
think about their #11 alma mater
in retrospect. Our Office of Career
Planning and Placement compiles
valuable data, but I have certain
curiosities beyond their questions.
So not long ago I sent off a small
questionnaire to the 30 people
whose forms I filled out in fall of
1986-people who, if going to law
school, are now in first year. Sixteen have responded so far. Nine
are in law school, three at Virginia
and one each at Brooklyn, Columbia, Harvard, North Carolina, Stanford, and Vanderbilt.
Of the seven not in law school,
two work in New York with trendy
two-year investment banking programs (Morgan Stanley and Smith
Barney). One is in a master's program in public policy at Chicago.
One, who graduated in 1984, continues to work with a consulting
firm in the Washington area;
another works in Washington for

her Carolina congressman; another
is an account executive with a large
regional communications firm. Of
these six students, four will enter
law school later, through deferred
admission: Columbia, Harvard,
Stanford, Virginia.
The seventh took the Radcliffe
Publishing Procedures Seminar last
summer
(confesses
that
he
"dreaded the notion of practicing
law") and is now writing for a satire
magazine, spy.
So already, in this trickle of returns, I am interested to see the
large proportion choosing not to be
in law school right away. The student enrolled at Stanford told me
that "about half' his class "did not
come
straight
from
another
academic program." The student
working at Smith Barney (accepted
at Columbia, Texas, NYU, and Virginia) is "looking forward to returning to grad school, either business, law, or both, but working for
two years first is great."
What also interested me was the
success of these able people in getting into good places. The Stanford
student was also accepted by Yale
and Harvard law schools and by
the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. Of the 16 respondents, five got Harvard acceptances, four Yale, four Columbia,
and five Stanford. (These are the
top schools, according to U.S.
News.) Only two applied to the fifth
school, Chicago (one accepted, one
waitlisted), and only three applied
to the sixth-ranked school, California at Berkeley (one accepted, one
waitlisted, and one denied). Seven
applied to Harvard.
Of the 16 students, eight were
accepted by all the law schools they
applied to-ranging from two to
mne.
You might ask (as I did) whether
it helps to take a prep course for
the Law School Admission Test.
Eight of the 16 took such a course
(the Stanley Kaplan course is prob19

ably the best known), but the student who got a perfect score of
48 didn't. The student with the
second-highest score (46) did take a
prep course. But one of the seven
not in law school, who scored in
the 30s, didn't-"obviously a mistake in my case"-and neither did
the lowest-scoring student (29), also
not in law school. Each of these last
two students, by the way, did get
one acceptance to law school.
As to those raw figures : A score
of 48 on the LSAT means you're
nationally in the 99.8th percentile.
The 46 puts you at 99.3 per cent,
40 puts you 89.8 per cent, 30 puts
you way down at 47.6 per cent. Of
my sampling of 16 students, 10
scored 41 or higher, and another
three were 38 or 39.
While with raw figures, you
might be interested in the cumulative grade-point average of the
people accepted at places like Harvard, Yale, and Stanford. As I
know from writing recommendations year after year, GPA alone
does not measure achievement.
One of the two students accepted
by all three schools, for example,
was a major student leader last
year, and his GPA is only the third
highest in my group. Harvard took
two men and three women, with
GPAs 3.70, 3.68, 3.66, 3.63, 3.48.
Stanford took exactly the same five.
The Yale four were 3.86, 3.70,
3.68, and 3.48.
Of the 16 students, all but one
are in our computer database (the
exception is a student who
graduated in the quaint mechanical
era of 1977). So in gathering supplementary information (I kept the
survey itself brief), I leave out this
one student, whose file is in an attic
of a distant building.
Meanwhile, with 15 returns, only
five students completed departmental honors programs. That surprised me. Also, only three got into
Phi Beta Kappa, which surprised
me even more.
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Four students elected the option
of the scholars program to choose
no major, instead constructing individual programs according to their
desires. Another student created a
formal Interdisciplinary Major, and
one followed our interdisciplinary
Political and Social Thought program. Two had double majors (that
is, completed separate majors in
two distinct areas); one did foreign
affairs and Latin American Studies,
the other did mathematics and history, and both were women. English and economics were the most
popular majors, four and three, respectively. Five of the 15 students
studied abroad for degree credit.

What surprised students
in their first law term?
We got a fascinating
range of responses.
Given my choice of "very well
prepared," "well prepared," or "not
well prepared," the nine students
ending their first semester in law
school responded six "well" and
three "very." The student at Harvard stated cautiously: "I believe
that most people are 'well prepared' because law school is quite
different
from
undergraduate
school." The Stanford student offered statistics preceding an apparent compliment to alma mater: "64
of 175 (of my class) are from Harvard, Yale, Stanford, or Princeton-I've seen no evide-nce that
their educations have prepared
them better."
What surprised students in their
first term? Even from only nine
students, a fascinating range of responses. The "uptight attitude of
the students in general" at Columbia is "very different from the relatively relaxed atmosphere" here.
Even at Vanderbilt, in Country
Music City, "the students are a bit
up-tight." Law school at Virginia "is
easier than I expected and less con-

frontational"; also at Virginia, law
is "enjoyable," and "students work
together, not against each other."
The Harvard student was surprised at "the intensity of those
who have taken some time off between college and law school."
Perhaps fitting into that category,
the 1977 graduate, enrolled at a
school not in the top ten, went on
at some length about surprise "that
I have not been at a distinct disadvantage by entering after a long
hiatus from college." With an
LSAT score of 43 (42 is 94.6 per
cent), he obviously has ability on
top of real-life experience, and his
thoughts unfolded as follows:
It appears to me that the nature of
law school is quite different from
college-much of the learning of
the law is on an independent
rather than "spoon-fed" basis-and
lectures tend to highlight areas of
the law on which the law student is
expected to have already gained an
insight. To this end, I believe that
a student must draw on skills developed through study and simple
observation of the world, rather
than "knowledge" of facts .
I therefore suggest strongly [the
student happens to have been a
biology major] a well-rounded exposure to the humanities as a background, without too much concern
given to "pre-law" curricula. It really matters little if you come in
with background in "constitutional
law ," 'jurisprudence," or "the operation of government."
Yet, when asked to recommend
two
or
three
undergraduate
courses to future law students, they
chose exactly those law-related
courses that I privately predicted .
(We have no "pre-law" program at
the university in Dogwood, but we
assuredly have an "invisible curriculum" that pre-law students early
learn about: Henry Abraham
teaching Constitutional Law , Kenneth Elzinga teaching Antitrust Policy by case method , Charles
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McCurdy teaching two semesters of
major cases in Early American Law
and Modern American Law.)
Take micro- and macroeconomics. Add an intermediate writing
course; perhaps add Joseph Kett
teaching two semesters of U.S. Intellectual and Cultural History.
Take in the Commerce School the
course in commercial law, and in
our philosophy department the
Philosophy of Law course.
Summing up the informal prelaw curriculum is my perfect 48
scorer who turned down acceptance at Yale and Chicago in order
to enroll less expensively at his
state university, Virginia: "A diverse course of study with classes in
economics, English, philosophy,
and history is the best preparation
for law school." He himself did the
departmental honors program in
economics. Looking up his record
to see how many philosophy
courses (two), I note also that he
took physics, chemistry, and differential equations, though our scholars program waives all area requirements.
Now all of this does tend somewhere-these anecdotes, statistics,
and fragments of fact and opinion.
The smallest reflection on the
foregoing paragraphs will suggest
some reasons why the university in
Dogwood is regarded as # 11 rather
than #22 or #100.
The obvious: We are blessed with
a fair number of super students,
and certain of our faculty are
world-class. The mean SAT scores
for the students admitted to our
scholars program (some 150 each
fall, out of 2,000 in Arts and Sciences) are 680 verbal and 700
mathematical. Students we later
add to the program often have
lower scores, but both groups display splendid achievements, abundant energy, and willingness to
"Get involved!" (as their elder
peers demand).
Our faculty , as noted, offer a
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range of courses perfect for prelaw students-but courses not intended as such. Law and Society is
a sociology course. Constitutional
Limitations is an American government course. We have no writing
course aimed toward a specific profession. University # 11 is large
enough to have an impressive array
of "pre-law" courses, and sensible
enough to give each of them a disciplinary integrity.
Then the question of requirements. As long as you carefully
select for your scholars program
people who have already proven
themselves self-starters and eager
to find challenges, give them freedom. Don't insist on area requirements or a major, but do make
each student justify to a responsible
adviser every course each semester.
Make sure the "invisible curriculum" for pre-law students is openly
publicized within the program.
Finally, make sure the career office and the academic deans work
directly together, with a shared
commitment. In our pre-law handbook the career office makes plain
that you don't have to major in
government to go to law school. It
affirms explicitly a traditional liberal education-breadth of study
along with depth in the area of
your personal passion.
One could say more, perhaps insisting that all advisers remind students really to become people as interesting as they are capable of becoming. The student out working
since graduating in 1984 no doubt
put on his application (which
earned him acceptances at Columbia, Georgetown, Harvard, NYU,
Penn, Stanford, and Virginia) his
plans for last spring: a four-month
leave of absence for travel "independently through Hong Kong,
China, Tibet, Nepal, Burma, Thailand, Japan, and Hawaii." Now he's
ready for Harvard.
From Dogwood, yours faithfully,

c.v.

c:

Changing
Perspective
Albert Trost
I regularly teach courses in comparative foreign governments and
international relations. Practically
speaking, my coverage, in our small
department, takes in almost the
whole world.
When I first started teaching
some twenty-five years ago, my department head told me I would
need a subscription to the New York
Times, not only because it was the
best American newspaper in its
coverage of the world and the way
to keep current, but also because it
represented the middle of the
American ideological spectrum in
its editorial position. He was so
convinced of the paper's value that
he doubled as the campus subscription agent. If he received a commission for this service, I am sure
that it did not even pay for his own
subscription. His salesmanship was
the beginning of my own love affair with the paper, which some
might say grew into a consuming
addiction and dependence. My office has become notorious on campus for its stacks of yellowing pa-

Albert Trost is Chairman of the Department of Political Science at Valparaiso University and a regular contributor on public affairs to The Cresset.
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pers and files filled with clippings.
The New York Times was everything my department head had
claimed and more (especially on
Sunday). I have no real complaints;
it more than met my needs for current information. Indeed, I read
more than I needed to, especially
about American politics and culture, and inevitably fell behind. My
files bulged and the stacks of
partially-read papers grew, put
aside in the vain hope that they
could be finished at a later date.
Just as I was about to be consumed
or lost in the morass, we had to
move to a new office building.
This move, now eighteen months
ago, was the occasion for throwing
out most of the old papers, but
more radically, ending my twenty
year subscription to the Times. In
the interests of a neater office and
more time for other kinds of reading, I switched to The Economist as
my source for current information
on the rest of the world . It comes
once a week, is never more than a
hundred pages, covers the whole
world, and makes a neater stack. (I
might add that I still buy the Times
at the newstand as I have time to
read it, and my office remains cluttered.) As it has turned out, the
switch led to a beneficial change in
perspective.
Many of our readers will know
The Economist, as it is a frequentlycited source in undergraduate term
papers. It is a cross between a Time
or Newsweek and the Wall Street
Journal. Most importantly for me, it
is British, that is, not American. It
is in the middle of the British political spectrum, standing closest to
the Liberal party. Certainly in economic
policy
it
stands
for
liberalism. Like the New York Times,
it tends to be internationalist (as
opposed to nationalist) m its
foreign policy perspective. Though
it is British, British news takes up a
far lesser proportion of the publication than does American news in
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the New York Times. If it sounds
close to the T imes, I have so far
given the wrong impression. The
differences in perspective between
the two are profound . Since I have
taken up The Economist, I have lost
confidence in the N ew York Times as
a comprehensive and cosmopolitan
source for information (though I
have not lost enjoyment in reading
it).

In the interests of a
neater office and more
time for other kinds of
reading, I switched to
The Economist as my
source for current news
on the rest of the world.
Not unexpectedly, the British
publication is interested in developments in ·parts of the world only infrequently covered in the Times. It
also provides regular coverage
from more places. Given the great
extent of the former British Empire, this is probably to be expected. South and Southeast Asia
get regular coverage. This area
contains one-quarter of the world's
population and , in India, the
largest democracy in the world.
Also to be expected is the greater
attention to Europe, especially the
nations of the European Community. Less expected, and highly welcome, are the frequent articles on
Eastern Europe. The Middle East
receives extensive coverage, with
much more on the Arab nations
than one would find in any American newspaper. Israel rates only
slightly more coverage than would
any nation of four million people
in a strategic area. Unfortunately,
Africa is the same neglected mystery in The Economist that it is in
American papers, despite the fact
that a large part of it was also part
of the British Empire.

The most important effect of
shifting one's focus from primary
concern with Central America,
Japan , and the Soviet Union to the
Middle East and Asia, at least for
an American reader, is that developments in the world can be
seen in a light other than that of
strategic encounter with the Russians or trade rivalry with the
Japanese. The most obvious pattern one sees from the new focus is
the persistence of religion and
nationalism
(or
ethnicity)
m
motivating political behavior. For
instance, this more traditional dimension of conflict is the major
feature of what was formerly
British India-the modern states of
India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and
Sri Lanka. Its influence is also critical in Southeast Asia, Afghanistan,
the Middle East, and Africa.
The influence of religion and
ethnicity is not denied in our press,
but it is harder to find because of
a more limited geographical focus
and something of a fixation on
ourselves and our influence on the
other national cultures of the
world. We tend to assume that the
rest of the world, when they know
better, will want to follow us and a
banner-carrier like the New York
Times down the road of liberal democracy, modernization, and secularization. The British have already suffered their disillusionment
on this score.
Another clear theme in the perspective of the contributors to The
Economist is that they are much
more accepting of an American
political and military role in the
world than we are. President
Reagan, Casper Weinberger, and
Oliver North notwithstanding, the
American public and most of the
press have never been enthused
about American intervention or a
military presence abroad. Most of
the American press, and certainly
the N ew York Times, are very skeptical about American intervention in
The Cresset

Central America, or the placement
of American troops in Lebanon or
American ships in the Persian Gulf.
There is even growing disillusionment with American troops in Europe, as can be seen by comments
in Congress and the press and by
the results of public opinion polls.

The editors of The
Economist are dismayed
by the low level of
American political
leadership, of which they
see President Reagan as
more than representative.
The intended withdrawal of
American medium-range ballistic
missiles from Europe (in line with
the recent American-Soviet agreement), far from placating the withdrawal fever, is likely to stimulate it
even more. The Soviet Union does
not seem as threatening as it once
did. The European public does not
seem to want us. Indeed, the Europeans appear not to be able even to
rouse themselves to increase their
own defense .
The Economist, speaking on behalf
of governing elites in Europe and
of Center and Center-Right political opinion there, pleads for caution on our part and for a renewed
commitment to European defense.
People of The Economist's persuasion view Europe as more vulnerable than ever to a military threat
from the Soviet Union , and they
note with dismay the disinclination
of European parliaments to do anything about it. They see the continued presence of American conventional forces and the deterrent
effect of American long-range nuclear forces as the main guarantees
of their security.
The Economist also sees the dangers of President Reagan rushing
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to disarm all nuclear forces for Europe, though it recognizes that
American public opinion may not
see things in the same way. Similarly, The Economist gives us an alternative perspective on our presence in the Persian Gulf. It reminds us of the interests of Europe
and Japan in securing a steady flow
of oil from that region and of the
incapacity of their own forces to do
this. With better connections to the
Arab world , the magazine is also
more sensitive to the interests of
Arab governments in limiting Iranian power.
Although skeptical about the
prospects for peace in Central
America, or of the inclination of
the Sandinista government in
Nicaragua to reform itself, The
Economist was as critical of the IranContra affair as was the New York
Times. Like most Europeans, the
editors of The Economist are mystified by the crusading zeal of
Americans. Also like most Europeans, they are dismayed by the
low caliber of American political
leadership, of which they see President Reagan as more than representative.
The Economist remains unconvinced that the American p"rocess
of Presidential selection can do
much better. With tongue in cheek,
the lead editorial in the October
17, 1987 number said that our
process was especially good at
"flushing out the false boast, the
sexual peccadillo, and the murky
incident back in college." But as for
eliciting good leadership-the "ability to cope with the unexpected"
and to "bring about the unexpected"-it did not really expect
our system to meet the test.
The journal is likewise dismayed
by the level of political debate in
our country, which is characterized
in a November 14, 1987 editorial as
"pure and simple." The article was
written on the occasion of the withdrawal of Judge Ginsburg from

consideration for a position on the
United States Supreme Court and
in the wake of continuing revelations about Senators Hart and
Biden. The editorial suggested that
the standard of moral purity and
simplicity in judging public officials
was not as important as qualities of
wisdom, intelligence, and experience. In The Economist's view, the
parliamentary systems of Europe
are more the standard to which we
should aspire for both the selection
of leaders and the style and substance of public debate.

The Economist does not
have everything right.
Its focus is Europe, and
Europe, though close to
us in heritage and
through alliance, is not
the only interest we have.
The Economist does not have everything right. Europe, though
close to us in heritage and through
alliance, is not the only interest we
serve. Nor is it likely that, in the
celebration of 200 years of the
Constitution, we will throw off our
system (or our political culture) for
a parliamentary system. However,
I, for one, find The Economist's alternative view of things quite bracing. I was becoming too introverted. American problems and
perspectives were becoming my
exclusive preoccupation. Hopefully,
I will not have to wait for the next
change of offices to find new
sources of stimulation. There is
certainly even a wider world available than that of The Economist. Its
understanding of international security and global responsibility is
also, finally, too narrowly-based.
But for the change of perspective it
offered me I can truly say, "thanks,
I needed that."
Cl
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Film & the Novel
Edward Byrne
III. The Writer and Hollywood
The films take our best ideas. We work
like slaves, inventing, devising, changing to please the morons who run this
game. We spend endless hours in search
of novel ideas and, in the end, what do
we get for it? A lousy fortune!
-Alexander King
Fifty thousand
thoughts.

dollars

for

your

-Sam Spiegel
That the relationship between
writers and the leaders of the film
industry has always been strained,
at times antagonistic, and that in
many cases this situation continues
today, is almost a given fact in Hollywood. Nevertheless, when young,
untested novelists can collect $1
million for screen rights to their
unpublished manuscripts and even
the average screenwriter can command $150,000 just to polish a
filmscript, the writers' reluctance to
work with Hollywood becomes difficult for most moviegoers to comprehend.
Perhaps this inability to understand the confrontational relation-
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ship between writers and film producers is the result of a failure to
grasp the complexity of the conflicts at work in such a kinship.
After all, any investigation of the
history of the relationship between
the writer and Hollywood may reveal as much about the impact the
cinema has had on American literary art and American society as it
does about the positions of the
principal parties involved.
No one would deny that the art
of filmmaking was altered forever
when the narrative forms of literature were introduced to the cinema
in those early days of the silent-film
era. As has been noted, D.W. Griffith's adaptation of Thomas Dixon's
novel, The Clansman, into a movie
masterpiece, Birth of a Nation, not
only readjusted the expectations
for fiction in film by the growing
American audience, but also further
redefined the way in which future
directors would view their own
medium. As Francois Truffaut
stated: "When cmema was mvented, it was initially used to record life, like an extension of
photography. It became an art
when it moved away from the
documentary. It was at this point
that it was acknowledged as no
longer a means of mirroring life,
but a medium by which to intensify
it."

Thus the dominant form for
filmmakers
became
fictional
storytelling on screen. And accompanying the acceptance of plays
and novels as legitimate sources for
narrative film, directors discovered that they often had to make
an effort to enter into an uneasy alliance with the playwrights and
novelists who gave birth to those
narratives. The result has been the
kind of uncomfortable relationship
filled with bickering one often
finds existing between biological
parents and stepparents or adoptive parents: despite everyone acting only with the finest of inten-

tions, each desiring that which is
best for the child, a confrontation
often occurs among all and the
chaos which results creates a confusion as to whose interests are being
served-those of the child or those
of the parents.
During the silent-film era, difficulties between novelists and
filmmakers did not occur on a
large scale. Still, in the beginning,
as the first books were adapted for
the screen, film producers did attempt to reject any arguments that
fees ought to be paid for screen
rights, declaring that the publicity
received by both the book and its
author would be ample reimbursement for all rights. When the
courts upheld the claims of authors
for monetary compensation, the
economic concerns of novelists and
playwrights were protected; however, an additional regard for retention of authorial rights was forfeited. Any entitlement to power
over the production process of the
film was relinquished by the writer
when the business transaction took
place, unless otherwise covered in
the contract.
The film studios acceded to the
demands for payment of writers
but held firm on contract concessions which would surrender any
power or control over the final film
product. Anyway, at the time such
statements were considered unnecessary by most writers and,
therefore, did not appear in the
contracts. In the 1920s, the novel
was the preferred art form and
America's novelists, led by F. Scott
Fitzgerald and Ernest Hemingway,
were among the country's most
noted celebrities. In addition, along
with the literary cntics and
academics, America's fiction writers
did not take the cinema seriously as
an art form or as a potential source
of competition.
Even into the 1930s, Hollywood
was merely a place for a novelist to
make some quick cash between
The Cresset

publications. This is clearly illustrated in the biographical accounts
of Fitzgerald and William Faulkner,
both of whom despised working in
Hollywood. Each detested the artificiality of its environment, mistrusted the motives of its inhabitants, and questioned the worth of
its work, but neither could refuse
the lucrative offers originating
from the West Coast. Faulkner
summed up his attitude toward
working in film when he commented that "Hollywood is the only
place in the world where a man can
get stabbed in the back while climbing a ladder."
Writers who in the 1920s viewed
the movies as harmless diversions
not worthy of serious consideration
soon came to see films as a threat
to their positions in society and to
their art. Four major reasons can
be cited for this transformation of
authors'
feelings
toward
the
cinema. First, as the economic depression of the 1930s forced Americans to clutch more tightly to their
income, that portion spent in nonessential areas, including entertainment, lessened-and the cost of a
movie ticket was cheaper than the
cover price of a novel. Next, the
popular comedies of the early
Thirties and the extravagant musicals of the mid- and late Thirties
witnessed in the dark sanctuary of
a movie theatre provided an escape
from the troubles many Americans
were experiencing in everyday life,
at a point in literary history when
the best novels served only as reminders of the hard times. Third,
as fewer novels were bought, fewer
were published. At the same time,
the production of films flourished.
As a result, with a few exceptions
novelists lost their power as celebrities, replaced by the larger-thanlife figures of the silver screen.
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, with the transition from silent films to all-talking features,
filmmakers trespassed upon terriMarch, 1988

tory formerly the exclusive property of the playwrights and
novelists-words. Suddenly, in addition to discovering a pictorial
representation of his book on
screen, a novelist could find his
characters speaking words which
differed from the dialogue in his
novel. Directors now had the ability
to alter the language-perhaps to
tailor the words used by the novel's
narrator-in order to suit the
cinematography, and many writers
felt their work violated in the process.

Today American
playwrights, novelists,
and screenwriters are
beginning to appreciate
film as an art form
worthy of their efforts.
The attitude of screenwriters
seemed no better. In 1933, James
M. Cain wrote, "Of the three
hundred or so writers actually employed in Hollywood, I suppose I
know fifty, and I don't know one
who doesn't dislike movie work,
and wish he could afford to quit
it." Cain was one of the few
novelists able to adjust to writing
for film . Working in Hollywood for
nearly two decades (1931-1948), he
understood that cinema was a separate medium, a separate art form,
and to expect an exact re-creation
of another medium was unrealistic,
perhaps even undesirable. As Cain
explained, "That thing up there
isn't primarily the record of a
novel, a play, or a story. It is a
series of photographed pictures."
The logical conclusion one could
infer, therefore, was that those who
control what pictures appear and in
which order they are presented
would possess the power, would be
this medium's true authors.
Half a century later, America's

writers are beginning to take advantage of this knowledge. For decades American authors followed
advice similar to that recently rendered by John Updike when he
suggested that the author ought "to
take the money and run. And hide,
ideally. For the author owes, at
least, his Hollywood benefactors a
tactful silence." This recommendation was seconded by Nicholas Delbanco, a former student of Updike
who has had his own negative reactions to seeing one of his novels
transfered to film, when he recently counseled writers to "follow
Woody Allen's wisdom, to 'take the
money and run,' and avoid dealing
with film people."
But now American playwrights,
novelists, and screenwriters are beginning to appreciate film as a serious art form worthy of their efforts
and respectable as an item in their
bibliographies. In turn, they are
striving for more significant say in
the shape of the final product, and
when denied by the studios, are
seeking alternative avenues to sole
control of the celluloid versions of
their works. Although the number
of authors able to annex power in
film production onto their existing
strength as creators of the original
texts is still admittedly small, precedents are being set every day.
In the last eleven months, examples of well-made movies which
have resulted from writers' greater
active involvement in the vanous
stages of film production include
John
Sayles' Matewan,
David
Mamet's House of Games, William
Kennedy's Ironweed, Jay Mcinerney's Bright Lights, Big City, and the
multitude of films now appearing
with hyphenated credits reading
"writer-director"-such as September
(Woody Allen) and Wall Street
(Oliver Stone), or "writer-producer"-such as Stakeout (Jim Kouf)
and Dirty Dancing (Eleanor Bergstein), or even "writer-director-producer"-such as Raising Arizona
25

Qoel and Ethan Coen), Planes,
Qohn
Trains,
and Automobiles
Hughes), Hope and Glory Qohn
Boorman), and Broadcast N ews
Uames L. Brooks).
Although when viewing these
movies one is aware that all these
writers appear to have recognized
the need to fit their scripts for the
screen and to surrender some of
the inherent strengths and intrinsic
merits evident in the written word
for the force cinematic techniques
can afford, this trend seems to be
one which will assure more possibility of creative unity, of imaginative
input, and of constructive contribution, on and off the set.
In recent years, John Sayles has
been the most visible example of a
novelist-filmmaker. Sayles' work,
both as a writer and as a director,
has received critical praise. Although he has made a fine studio
film (Baby, It's You) , Sayles has felt
more comfortable in the role of independent filmmaker,
creating
such films as Return of the Secaucus 7
and The Brother from Another Planet
in addition to his latest about the
1920s West Virginia mine war,
Matewan, a film that resulted from
research for his novel, Union Dues.
The critical success Sayles has increasingly enjoyed as each of his
films has been released , although
not yet matched economically, has
served as a model for others, most
noticeably David Mamet.
House of Games, a film written
and directed by Mamet, best known
as one of America's leading playwrights (his 1984 play, Glengarry
Glen Ross, won a Pulitzer prize), has
found itself listed on many critics'
year-end "Best of 1987" honor
roles. Mamet, who has won praise
as a scriptwriter for the film remake of James M. Cain's novel The
Postman Always Rings Twice as well
as for The Verdict and The Untouchables, was frustrated by the pseudocollaborative nature involved m
"working as a screenwriter-for26

hire" and answering to directors
who had the right to ignore his
suggestions, even if those directors
happened to be such fine filmmakers as Sidney Lumet or Brian De
Palma.

David Mamet has joined
John Sayles as an
independent filmmaker,
a writer-director. He
has discovered the
director's role as true
auteur of the medium.
Speaking of his experiences at
work on The Untouchables in an article written for American Film,
Mamet bitterly echoes the sentiments voiced by a long line of writers since the publication of F. Scott
Fitzgerald's The Last Tycoon and
Nathaniel West's Day of the Locusts:
"Hollywood is the city of the modern gold rush, and money calls the
turn. That is the first and last rule
we know of Hollywood"-we permit
ourselves to be treated like commodities in the hope that we may,
one day, be treated like valuable
commodities. . . . We all do it
either in resignation , or in the
hope of subsequent gain. But none
of us like it .. . ."
Mamet has therefore joined
Sayles
as
an
independent
filmmaker, a writer-director. He
has discovered the director's role as
true auteur of the medium, has determined that the real nature of
film "is not a collaboration, which
implies equality, if not of contribution, at least of position. Film is
produced under the most stringent
and detailed conditions of hierarchy . . . . "
Some novelists, however, have
been able to work successfully
within that hierarchy. In the last
couple of months, William Kennedy and Jay Mcinerney have re-

ported positive, cooperative relationships with the directors of the
film versions of their books. Kennedy's Pulitzer Prize-winning novel,
Ironweed, has been brought to the
screen by director Hector Babenco,
who previously directed Kiss of the
Spider Woman. Kennedy says of the
experience: "Film is Babenco's
medium and I sit in the front row
of the loge and cheer. I don't expect a full translation of the novel.
... Cutting a novel to pieces is not
serious. But shaping a story for
another medium can be a totally
different sort of artistic exercise of
the imagination." Kennedy has
acknowledged the disgruntled writings of screenwriters of the past,
particularly Raymond Chandler,
but he believes he has been more
fortunate for having arrived "in a
later year, working not within the
studio system, but with an independent producer ... and with a contract that gives as much control to
a writer" as his lawyer has ever witnessed.
Jay Mcinerney, too, has been
blessed with a director for Bright
Lights, Big City who has encouraged
a close working relationship with
the writer. In fact, it was James
Bridges, best known as director of
The China Syndrome, who had requested Mcinerney's contributions
and who had retained in the film
chapter titles from the novel, not in
an attempt to re-create exactly the
novelist's version of Bright Lights,
Big City, but to benefit by a blending of that version and the director's vision. Mcinerney recognizes
that directors are the authors of
films , that "writers don't make
movies. But at the same time, every
writer wants to participate, to have
some kind of input."
Still, the desire of many directors
to maintain whole control and not
deal
with
another's
versiOn ,
another's vision, has created a
perplexing situation. It seems that
the most popular solution to this
The Cresset

pleasant dilemma, a scenario which
is becoming more and more a commonplace
circumstance
for
filmmakers, is for the directors to
write an original screenplay. This is
certainly not new. For filmmakers
during the silent era like Charlie
Chaplin and Buster Keaton, it was
a normal occurrence.
However, since the uttered word
entered the movies, the writerdirector has not been the rule in
American film, but the noted exception. Nonetheless, with the end
of total control by the studios, the
acceptance of the auteur theory, the
new, universal access to film as videotape recorders have become a
standard addition to almost every
~orne, and the social reception of
cmema as our most popular and
most influential art form, filmmakers in America, evidenced by the
current films of Woody Allen,
Oliver Stone, James L. Brooks, and
a number of others, have moved
inexorably toward the nearly complete independence once enjoyed
by writers of novels and plays.
European
directors
such
as
Federico Fellini, Francois Truffaut,
and
Ingmar
Bergman
demonstrated this sort of independence decades ago, but American
moviemakers are only now starting
to secure a similar tradition.
Finally, just as Hannah and Her
Sisters by Woody Allen, himself a
prize-winning fiction writer, originally had been conceived as a novel
but was transformed into a
filmscript (also retaining its chapter
titles in the movie), resulting in a
binding together of both means of
expression, likewise other American filmmakers, as true "authors,"
are now blurring the artificial
?ou~daries separating story-telling
m cmema from the other narrative
literary forms, strengthening the
case for consideration of American
film as another branch of American literature.
Cl
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Holing the Ice
I

The ice was thick the morning my uncle
asked me to chop holes so the fish could breathe.
The few chickens he had watched me climb
the fence to the pond, while he watched
from the kitchen to see if I would put
the poles in so the ice wouldn't freeze shut.
I knew he was watching, but I couldn't tell
if it was a joke, just something to watch
me do before I returned to California, something
to laugh at over biscuits and gravy as we sat
close around the big table in the kitchen, remembering.
But I swung the axe and the ice splintered.
I swung and drove the axe deeper, listening
to the echoes of the axe from the timber
across the tracks from the stubbled corn.
I dug whole chunks of ice out, there in
the milky sun, biting into the ice as it showered
over me, humming sounds with the axe bathed
in the brutal joy of swinging. Then wh:n the posts
were in place I turned toward the farmhouse
knowing my uncle was there at the kitchen window
his breath warm against the cold glass, watching. '
II

At t?e funeral I .was ~he only one not wearing
a smt as we earned h1m past the relatives
and friendi that stood in the rain that wasn't
expected. I think even now I only half-believe
them when they tell me how I wouldn't let him
down into that black hole; how I wanted to leave
the shovel in so the dirt wouldn't close over him
and how the cemetery workers watched from be~eath
the maples as I threw the dirt down into
the coldness, into the darkness, working in
the soft rain, throwing the black wet earth,
wat~hing it rise towards me, until they stopped me,
stanng.
I left without looking back, knowing the ice
would freeze over, sensing the dark-holed fish
suspended in their silence, not knowing if they
would last until spring, remembering only
the swinging.

J. T. Ledbetter
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Timely Issues
For the Aging
John Steven Paul
I'm Not Rappaport has found its
audiences-everywhere. It arrived
in New York in 1985 from its
birthplace at the Seattle Repertory
Theatre with Judd Hirsch and
Cleavon Little giving virtuoso performances in the leading roles. It
won the Tony Award for the best
play of the 1985-86 season. Hirsch
and Little took the play on a
hugely successful national tour,
while the production, featuring
other actors, played on at the
Booth Theatre in New York. Recently, Hirsch and Little returned
to the Booth to reprise their roles.
Their performances in this alternately hilarious, sweet, and depressing play are major reasons for its
success. But credit playwright Herb
Gardner with capturing the spirit of
the age.
We are well aware that America
is aging. And like it or not, more
and more of our citizens are living
in retirement homes or spending
their lunch and supper hours at
senior centers. With Nat Moyer,
one of the old men in I'm Not Rappaport, they've anticipated with

John Steven Paul is Director of the
University Theatre at Valparaiso University and drama critic for The Cresset.
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some reluctance enduring guest
speakers like "Jerome Cooper
[who] will lecture on 'Timely Issues
for the Aging'; refreshments will be
served to anyone who's alive at the
end." It should be no surprise,
then, when plays about old people
are hits. And indeed, all of us out
here in the audience are aging.
Two old men sitting in Central
Park passing time. Nat Moyer is a
Jew; Midge Carter is black. They
share very few common memories,
interests, passions, or commitments.
Nat was a waiter and a radical
socialist dedicated, at least intellectually, to the liberation of the workers from the chains of capitalism.
Midge still ekes out a living as a
building superintendent, studies
the weekly Sporting News, and
fondly
remm1sces
about
his
triumphs in amateur boxing tournaments. Apparently, the two have
nothing in common. But the fact of
their age-they are both in their
eighties-forces them into a comradeship that transcends any of the
historical details that might separate them.
Daily, Nat and Midge confront
the antagonists of the aged:
cataracts, glaucoma, brittle bones,
loss of balance, and encroaching
senility. They are victims of high
prices, hoodlums, and a younger
generation that has neither the
time to deal with them nor a true
sense of their needs.
None of these villains is more
terrifying to them, however, than
the prospect of losing the self. The
specter in I'm Not Rappaport is ''I'm
Not." Nat and Midge fight to defend their frail "I Ams" against the
powerful forces of ''I'm not." They
are united in this struggle, the two,
and they battle more desperately
than Nat ever fought against the
bosses or Midge his Golden Gloves
tournament opponents.
In his stunning Driving Miss
Daisy, Alfred Uhry also deals passionately and compassionately with

the latter stages of the aging process. This play has also received
unanimously positive notices.
Uhry drew on some of the elements in his own Atlanta boyhood
for Driving Miss Daisy. One of his
grandmothers had an accident, like
Miss Daisy's, in which she demolished her car, but didn't even
break her eyeglasses. Now Daisy's
son doubts that she can get further
driving insurance, and he doesn't
want to live with the worry if she
could. Over her fierce objections,
he retains a sixty-year-old chauffeur for her. Much of the play's
subsequent action takes place in the
car.
Two old people sitting in a car
on the road to nowhere important.
Daisy Werthen is a Jew; Hoke Colburn is black. They share practically no memories in common.
Uhry has given us few details about
Daisy and Hoke's histories, but her
whiteness and his blackness against
the background of Atlanta give us
as clear a picture of their different
experiences as we need. What they
do share is the outsider status their
ethnicity brings them. For Daisy,
Hoke is one of "them"-the colored. For Hoke, Miss Daisy is one
of "them"-the Jews. And, of
course, they are members of
another minority sub-culture-the
aged.
The focal point of Driving Miss
Daisy is the car, or, rather, a series
of cars, as the action unfolds over
twenty-five years. Uhry uses the
issue of the car to open Daisy's
character for our inspection. When
her well-meaning son Bootie insists that his mother no longer
drive herself she takes offense on
several levels. She worries about appearing to be wealthy enough to
employ a chauffeur. She frets
about having another one of
"them" around the house (we hear
about !della, a maid who is also
black, though we never see her).
She feels the ironic sting of a son
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revoking his mother's driving
privileges. Finally, though there is
no reason she can't go wherever
she wants whenever she wants,
Daisy fears the loss of her independence. For Daisy, the chauffeur is
living evidence that she has lost the
first battle in the long war in defense of her independent self.
It must be said that while Rappaport's Midge Carter and Daisy's
Hoke Colburn are allies in the
struggle to preserve the self, it is
Nat Moyer and Daisy Werthen who
are on the front lines. Their objectives are similar. Both Nat and
Daisy strive to maintain the illusion
of their own independence. One
who is not independent, they seem
to believe, is of no consequence;
one of no consequence is of no significance; and one of no significance is no one. Nat and Daisy
each fight fiercely to remain someone.
Nat Moyer is a past master of illusionism. Creating characters is his
modus vivendi. From time to time,
he is "Hernando," a Cuban Terrorist; "Harry Schwartzman," a
cover for "Sam Schwartzman," spy;
"Ben Reissman," a labor lawyer
from the firm of Reissman,
Rothman, Rifkin, and Grady; "Dr.
Fred Engels," of the Socialists'
Club; "Anthony Donatto," a gangster; and "Nat Moyer," a movie
mogul.
Along with the name goes a line
of chatter that Nat reels off with
the enthusiasm of a man who lives
to hear himself talk. More importantly, Nat deploys his characterizations to make himself effectual.
Early in the play, he watches as
Midge suffers a visit from Pete
Danforth, the president of his
building's tenant committee. Due to
Midge's advanced age and poor
eyesight, the committee has decided to find a replacement for
him; that is, to retire him. Uninvited, Nat springs into action as
"Ben
Reissman,"
representing
March, 1988

HURTSFOE, "the human rights
strike force ." Chutzpah incarnate,
Nat assaults the president's resolve
with threats of legal complications
for his tenants should they proceed
to dismiss Midge without exhaustive due process to protect his
rights. The president backs down.
Nat glows with a feeling of accomplishment.

I'm Not Rappaport and
Driving Miss Daisy
both confront the burdens
and fears of the aging.
Later, Nat dons the mask of
"Tony Donatto," mafioso godfather, to talk a violent drug dealer
temporarily away from a girl who
took a bit too much cocaine on credit. In another moment, he is promoting himself as another of the
masses tyrannized by the capitalists'
system in order to convince a
young hoodlum not to extort
money from Midge. Each time he
extends his eloquence in service to
the weak, Nat strengthens his own
illusion of significance. Ironically,
his assertion of independence depends on the presence of others.
Daisy Werthen protects her independence by asserting her superiority over Hoke, the chauffeur. He
responds deferentially to her in
tones of "yassum" and "no urn."
When she finally deigns to get into
the car with Hoke at the wheel, she
plays the backseat tyrant, issuing
decrees on everything from speed
to parking spaces. Later, she condescends to accept Hoke's kindnesses and she is especially pleased to
teach him to read. For as long as
possible she struggles to stay in the
driver's seat, even if she can't drive.
Because her sense of racial
superiority is integral to her sense
of self, Miss Daisy is very slow to
accept Hoke as an equal. But his irrepressible humanity and her in-

creasing enfeeblement drive their
relationship slowly from that of the
mistress and the servant through
the helpless and the helper and, at
last, to the friend and the friend. It
is not an easy progress. When
Boolie declines to threaten his position in the white business community by attending an honorary dinner for Martin Luther King, Jr.,
Miss Daisy has the opportunity to
invite Hoke to accompany her. It
would have been a happy outcome
to Uhry's play had the old Jewish
woman and the old black man gone
arm in arm to honor America's
greatest champion of civil rights.
But it doesn't happen. Miss Daisy
can't bring herself to invite Hoke,
and Hoke won't stoop to asking.
The outcome of the struggle is,
of course, inevitable. As she gets
older, Daisy comes to depend on
Hoke to get through the day. Idella
dies and Hoke's help extends
beyond the car and into the house.
She struggles to retain her illusion
of independence, but her mind
turns, and by the last scene the
ninety-seven-year-old woman has
been removed to a nursing home.
When Boolie drives Hoke to the
home for a Thanksgiving visit, he
finds her so incompetent that he
must spoon the pecan pie into her
mouth.
Gardner gives us an equally
tough vision in I'm Not Rappaport.
Nat as Ben Reissman has temporarily saved Midge's job and has
driven away the extortionist using
his cane. The kid beats him severely, but he's recovered. Now
he's got a real problem. His daughter Clara has found him again,
even though he's done his systematic best to give her the slip. It is
Clara who must pick up the pieces
when her father's radical schemes
go awry. Typically, the business
card that "Ben Reissman" thrust in
the tenant committee president's
face had her office telephone
number on it and she's been drawn
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into another embarrassing situation.
Clara has been Nat's dearest
daughter and the most loyal of his
four children. She took up his radical legacy with pride. Now she
looks at her battered father and
lovingly, firmly gives him three options: live with her family, move to
an old people's home in New Jersey, or register for monitored day
care and hot meals at a West Side
senior center. If he doesn't accept
one of these options, she's prepared to go to court to have him
declared incompetent.
Desperately, deftly, Nat conjures
up his grandest illusion. Long ago
he met a girl at the Grand Street library, his story begins, and they
fell in love. Four months after they
met, the girl left for a new life in
Israel. Six months later, says Nat,
he got a letter: there is a child.
And now this child, Sgt. Perlmann,
has come from Israel to take care
of him. They will return to Israel.
Clara need no longer worry about
her father. After agreeing to meet
her half-sister the following Friday,
Clara tearfully rushes off.
Clara leaves fully believing the
story Nat fully believes he had to
tell to save his life. Before Midge
can finish castigating Nat for "conning his own kid," their attention is
drawn to the beautiful twenty-fiveyear-old artist who has been sitting
sketching on the bridge above them
throughout much of the play. She's
being visited by an angry, violent
bill collector. He slaps the girl hard
and demands payment for cocaine
bills long overdue-by the next Friday.
When the drug dealer leaves the
girl quivering in front of the old
men, Nat conceives a way that his
fantastic stories can merge and save
both his life and Laurie's. Laurie
the junkie can stand in for Sgt.
Perlmann long enough to fool
Clara and then Nat and Laurie can
beat it out of New York. For a mo-
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ment, necessity seems to be the
mother of a wonderful new invention.
But it is not to be. Nat's attempt
as "Tony Donatto" to threaten the
drug dealer into leaving the girl
alone backfires. The hoodlum attacks Nat, and Midge draws the
man's fury when he tries to rescue
Nat. Both are badly beaten. Laurie
fails to make an appearance as
Sergeant Perlmann and Clara's
heart is broken by the ruse. Pete
Danforth and the committee have
found out there is no HURTSFOE
and have summarily fired Midge.
Even the young hood is back, now
demanding more protection money
than ever. Nat's attempts to maintain his effectiveness and independence have only debilitated him
further.
Yet where Uhry has left us with
the tragic sense of life, Gardner
leaves us laughing, or at least smiling. At the last, Nat confesses to
Midge that every one of his aliases
has been false. For the last forty
years he's been nothing but a waiter, a nobody. Having said that,
Nat makes to leave the park, but
Midge's retort holds him. Even
now, says Midge, he can't tell the
truth- he couldn't have been just a
waiter. Nat gratefully seizes the opportunity to assume yet another
identity and fashion another illusion:
Nat Moyer,
Hollywood
mogul.
It is quite fitting that the stories
of these determined illusionists
have found their way to the
theatre, which, as Pirandello has reminded us, is the domain of illusion. Herb Gardner derives his title
for I'm Not Rappaport from a vaudeville routine. It's a little bit of shtick
wherein the straight man repeatedly responds ''I'm not Rappaport" to a series of his partner's
questions, until the questioner can
find a way to trap the answerer
with one of his own, seemingly innocent, responses. Nat Moyer,

played by Judd Hirsch, is the interlocutor, and Midge Carter is the
straight man.
Much of the action has the
rhythm of a vaudeville turn. While
Midge rather resents being used as
a straight man, Nat Moyer loves
every minute: he is both on stage
and in the audience. Nat is a connoisseur of the language. His lingo
is equal parts of Karl and Groucho
Marx. Judd Hirsch brilliantly
blends the seriousness of the radical tradition with the zaniness of
the vaudeville clown into a tour-deforce.

If the texture of I'm Not Rappaport is vaudeville, Driving Miss
Daisy is pas-de-deux. The perfor-

mances are as economical as they
are beautiful. Every word, movement, and gesture employed by
Dana Ivey and Morgan Freeman
seem carefully chosen. What is not
needed is stripped away. Each
scene has just the necessary
number of words-and the requisite amount of silence-to move us
to the next stage in the progression
of the relationship.
Thomas Lynch has selected just a
few objects to create the setting for
Driving Miss Daisy. Two stools serve
for the car. Boolie Werthen's office
is suggested by a desk and two
chairs; his home, by a dresser. Miss
Daisy's house is suggested by an
arm chair, the small table next to it,
and a rug in front. The only decorative pieces on the set are a window table set with a graceful vase
brimming with a lush bouquet of
flowers. On the sparely furnished
stage the vase and flowers speak
eloquently of Daisy's taste, refinement, and sensibility. The two
houses and the office are mounted
on scenic wagons that move soundlessly onto the stage as needed.
The action is played against a cyclorama softly lit with blue light.
There is a wonderful functional
purity to the setting. It is by no
means monastically austere, but the
The Cresset

setting does suggest the inevitable
attenuation of life. In the latter
days of life there is only what is
necessary, a chair and a table. And ,
perhaps, one or two items, like a
vase of flowers, to recall the days of
a more fully accoutred existence.
Similarly, Nat Moyer and Midge
Carter burden themselves with but
a few material possessions. Nat uses
a cane and a walker and is never
without his briefcase (and who
knows what a library of radical literature might be in it); Midge has
his Sporting N ews. They have reduced life's venue to an area just
big enough for a couple of park
benches.
Tony Walton has designed a
romantically realistic Central Park
setting. His recreation of the park
in October is lushly detailed and
exact down to the fallen leaves.
The rich colors of the sky-azure
tinted with golds and pinks-give
the setting a constant luminescence.
This kind of extravagant scenery
satisfies the forty-dollar-a-ticket patron, and the artistic and technical
brilliance are delightful. But it certainly works no better than Lynch's
minimalist concept. In fact, the
Walton set is somewhat distracting
and it's not as if we need all those
leaves to tell us that Nat and Midge
are in the autumn of their lives.
It is the older characters who are
center stage in I'm Not Rappaport
and Driving Miss Daisy. But no
doubt most members in the large
and devoted audiences for these
plays are closer in age to Nat's
character Clara, in her early forties ,
and Boolie Werthen, who ages
from 40 to 65 during the course of
the play. It is Clara and Boolie who
look on at the octogenarians with
mixed senses of love, bemusement,
sorrow, frustration, and some degree of outrage. It is outrageous
that life will, in time, leave us enfeebled, ineffectual, and insignificant. This is the timely issue fo r the
~n~
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Grief
Walking the lane by the wood side, I find the ground,
With its sparse green, a cool, unhesitating rock. The leaves
Arch like a church window, like the leaves over the street you
Used to like to take home, the trees in their fierce, intimate stand
Shutting out the sky. Flocks of leaves. And, when the wind
Took them, it was like birds shaking off gravity, their treeward pull.
The braille of the trees speaking coolness, I feel the pull
Of this old spot. Yet, although the past lies brambled on the ground,
My first feeling is, strangely enough, a respect for what the wind
Cannot destroy. The wind is everywhere. In this weather it leaves
Nothing alone-not man or brush or tree.
And, of course, as I stand
Here, cold and calm in the pale light, I can't help seeing you
Walking this lane, bowing under the lowest leaves. You
Would go, sometimes, to gather blackberries for me, pulling
Them from their netting of thorns as you made a purple stand
In the dusk. (We ate them with cream later on familiar ground.)
And do you remember that time you brought flowers to me-leaves
Merry with dirt-the roots with their little vines winding
Around your knees? I feel like those flowers, but my pain unwinds
More slowly. I wonder what you'd say if, as you used to, you
Could pause and watch me, sweater to my chin, buried in the leaves
In this unbelievable stance, leaning to a tree for comfort as I pull
A leaf apart until its skeleton lies cradled on the ground.
The sky is dead like metal. Oh, I wish I could understand
What this means-this blur of unforgiveness--could understand
The one long thread that connects this lane, these trees, this wind
On my shoulders. Pe·r haps it's nothing so much as this cold ground
And the sun with nothing to say.
Darling, I know that you
Would want me to unfist my grief, but---<:an't you see?-the pull
Of sadness snapped is like torn knitting, is like those leaves
Crowding their deadness into the sky, those brown, sad leaves
Weighing down the air until it's impossible to stand
There for the numbers. Maybe one of these days I'll pull
My imagination back, not find my only pleasure in this cold wind,
And be able to think, without a winter's grief, of you
Lying there, your face a circle of otherness in the ground.
I want the wind to go along my bones, to cover my body with leaves.
I don't realize your dying or see any possible way to pull
Some kind of understanding out of this impenetrable ground.

Kim Bridgford
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Trapped
Dot Nuechterlein
Funny how things can remind
you of other things. Recently I
worked very late at the office, long
after everyone, including the custodians, had gone. When I visited the
rest room the door jammed briefly,
and I visualized spending all night
trapped in this tiny cubicle.
It was momentary, hardly long
enough to reprimand myself for
locking the door with no other living creature around (apart from
that mouse family in the Dean's office). But it stirred a memory of
once being locked inside a church.
It happened my senior year of
high school. I was a Preacher's Kid,
and that year I agreed to play the
organ for Dad's three churches.
Actually I just added two organs,
the large country church (pipe) and
the small-town mission (electronic),
since I already played for the little
hillbilly congregation's monthly service (pump).
Now you should understand that
while I played the organ, I was not
an organist. I have always been a
singer. My parents and two
brothers and three sisters all sing;
at family reunions, and whenever
we go to church together, we harmonize, making it up as we go
along. (This has been a source of
much embarrassment to my children , since it is habitual and therefore I sometimes do it alone.) Several of us siblings also married musical people, and nearly all of our
13 collective offspring make music.
But my only musical training was
from choirs, beginning in first
grade. My sisters came along when
family finances permitted formal
lessons. But I wasn't so lucky.
Apart from Mom's teaching me
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some piano basics, whatever
learned was on my own. I practiced
faithfully , though , using the hymnal as a lesson book.
At age nine I got my first job:
the one-room parochial school
teacher/organist/church custodian
paid me 25 cents each week to dust
the pews and windowsills and altar
carvings, and as a bonus he sometimes let me try some hymns on the
pipe organ .
So when we moved to a new
parish and Dad needed a hymnplayer for the little church tucked
away in the hills, I was, at age 13,
qualified to try it. That tiny congregation was supported by one man,
a farm boy who had moved to the
city and made good; he paid the
rent on the small white building,
bought the fuel for the potbellied
stove (I sometimes played with
gloves on!), and gave me the fantastic sum of five dollars each
month for helping out.
Then when the organist for the
country and town churches left
suddenly, yours truly-untrained,
but better than nothing-filled in
for a year. (Later I was "better than
nothing" again , serving as thirdstringer in two different congregations I attended . My specialty was
foreign languages: someone would
sit by me and tell me when to play
what, while the services proceeded
in Danish, or German, or Estonian.
They seemed tickled to have me,
mistakes and all.)
Now my family lived in the country, but my high school was in
town. Whenever I stayed for evening activities I'd walk to church
after school and practice. On this
particular occasion a workman had
come and gone while I was taking
a break; not realizing I was there,
he locked the door behind him. I
discovered my plight when I tried
to leave. That was in the days before mandatory crash bars, so the
door wouldn't open from the inside. There was no phone, and no

church bell to summon the outside
world. I was trapped.
Have you ever had such an experience? It is not pleasant. I
wasn't afraid, exactly, but it occurred to me that rescue might be a
long time in coming. My parents
knew I planned to spend the night
with a friend, so they wouldn't miss
me, and when I didn't show up my
friend would simply think my plans
had changed.
Naturally I checked the windows,
but they did not open. In a fire or
other emergency I suppose I could
have broken one, but my situation
was not that desperate. We had a
small kitchen, but no supplies were
kept besides coffee and tea. I remember thinking if I stayed all
night I could sleep on a pew, using
a tablecloth for a blanket.
After a couple of hours of fruitlessly looking for a solution, I decided I might as well do some
homework. I had barely sat down
at a basement table when my eye
landed on a small window near the
ceiling. Ah, yes! There was a window well on each side of the
church-maybe I could reach it
and climb up to ground level.
Whatever strength I possess has
always been in my head and my
mouth, not my hands or arms. It
took every ounce to drag the table
over and lift a chair onto it, then
unlatch the window hook. Fortunately that was a few pounds ago,
so I could squeeze through the tiny
opening into freedom .
There is no moral to this sto ry,
except maybe a small warning. A
church can be a refuge for the sinner and a haven for the spirit, but
it can also be a prison for the silent. I was trapped because nobody
knew I was there. Which leads me
to wonder if it is really such a good
idea to shush our kids in church all
the time. Would it be safer, do you
think, to get them to practice the
Biblical admonition to "make a joyful noise unto the Lord" ?
Cl
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